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I. Introduction

Attorneys and law firms know that the consequences for
submitting meritless pleadings and pursuing frivolous claims in
federal court can be serious. 1 When attorneys bring frivolous
claims or act to delay or otherwise impede litigation, they violate
the code of professional legal ethics and courts may sanction them
according to federal district court local rules. 2 Both attorneys and
firms may also face sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 3 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 4 and the court’s inherent authority. 5
This Note examines the circuit split regarding whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 authorizes district courts to sanction law firms and argues
that, in the context of today’s legal landscape, the statute should
apply to law firms to satisfy its original purpose of deterring
frivolous litigation. 6
Section 1927 provides that
[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceeding in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct. 7
1. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1583 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming
sanctions against a law firm for over $1 million); Carl W. Tobias, Rule 11 and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 513–14 (1989) (discussing the
heightened awareness and more conservative litigation of attorneys in light of
Rule 11 changes).
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N,
Discussion Draft 1983) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous . . . .”); infra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that most
federal district courts adopt the rules of professional conduct of the state in which
they are located).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (providing for sanctions against parties,
attorneys, or firms that file frivolous claims with the court).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (giving federal courts authority to issue
sanctions if counsel “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplies proceedings).
5. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–47 (1991) (finding that
neither Rule 11 nor § 1927 supersede the inherent authority of federal courts to
sanction parties or attorneys).
6. See infra Parts III–V (detailing the circuit split and proposing possible
solutions).
7. § 1927.
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Frivolous litigation is not a new issue; federal courts have long had
the authority under § 1927 and its predecessor statutes to sanction
attorneys who bring unreasonable or vexatious lawsuits. 8
Historically, courts and litigants rarely relied on § 1927 because it
did not include attorney’s fees. 9 Following the amendment of
§ 1927 in 1980 and the revision of Rule 11 10 in 1993, however,
courts and parties have more frequently sought sanctions under
§ 1927. 11
Courts award sanctions against lawyers and law firms for
conduct that impedes the judicial process and frustrates judges
and opposing parties. 12 This conduct can take many forms. 13
Attorneys may vexatiously file and withdraw motions or appeals,
creating unnecessary work for the opposing party and the court. 14
Law firms may knowingly bring or prolong meritless suits. 15 By
8. See Glenn J. Waldman, Federal Court Sanctions Against Attorneys
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927—The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Attempts to Divide
the Standard for Multiplying the Proceedings in Bad Faith, 81 FLA. B.J. 16, 19
n.12 (2007) (providing a brief summary of § 1927’s legislative history, which is
substantially derived from the Congressional Acts of 1813 and 1853); infra Part
II.A (detailing § 1927’s two-hundred-year history).
9. See Seth Katsuya Endo, The Propriety of Considering an Attorney’s
Ability to Pay Under § 1927, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 291, 293 (2013) (noting that courts
invoked § 1927 in only seven reported cases in the first 150 years after the
statute’s enactment).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (requiring an attorney’s signature on court
filings to confirm that any claims filed have merit, and authorizing sanctions for
attorneys and firms who file frivolous claims).
11. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 9, at 293 (observing that § 1927’s more
frequent usage has resulted in a circuit split regarding whether a district court
may consider an attorney’s financial status when issuing sanctions).
12. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 36–40 (1991) (describing
Chambers’s continued actions, despite warnings from the court, to thwart and
prolong litigation); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In
the words of the district court judge, ‘[t]his case has a long and tortured history.’”).
13. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (surveying various
examples of unethical conduct).
14. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.
2012) (noting the principal attorney’s repeated actions—filing then withdrawing
a temporary restraining order, a Rule 60 motion, and a defective appeal—
resulting in sanctions of over $300,000).
15. See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 754–55
(6th Cir. 2010) (finding meritless a suit claiming that a party misappropriated
trade secrets because the sale of the partner’s product occurred two years before
releasing the partnership’s product).
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allowing their attorneys to pursue unethical schemes, law firms
may prolong and delay litigation, contest decisions agreed by the
parties to be final, and fail to follow basic rules of civil procedure. 16
Not all sanctions mechanisms, however, apply equally to both
lawyers and law firms. 17
For example, different interpretations of § 1927 have resulted
in an unresolved split among the federal circuit courts of appeals
on the question of whether courts may apply § 1927 sanctions to
law firms. 18 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have held that § 1927 applies only to individual
attorneys. 19 Conversely, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have upheld § 1927
sanctions against law firms. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court has not
16. See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1291–92
(9th Cir. 2015) (describing the series of motions Kaass Law filed that led Wells
Fargo to bring its motion for sanctions); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764
F.2d 204, 206–08 (3d Cir. 1985) (addressing the parties’ agreement to abide by
the referee’s final decision and the losing party’s subsequent objection in direct
violation of the agreement).
17. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the current uncertainty regarding
§ 1927’s application to law firms in contrast to Rule 11).
18. See Kirk Swanson, Wells Fargo Won’t Get Sanctions from ‘Vexatious’ Law
Firm, BNA’S CORP. COUNSEL WKLY. (Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Swanson, Wells
Fargo],
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/s/news/58d080d243f348d7e6bff8ad1605f5d5/doc
ument/NUD6XN3H0JK0?highlight=swanson+wells+fargo+won%26%2339%3Bt
+get+sanctions (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (reporting on the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, which “deepens a circuit split” by holding that courts may not sanction
law firms under § 1927) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See, e.g., Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1293–95 (examining other circuit courts’
decisions and agreeing that § 1927’s language does not reach law firms); BDT
Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 751–57 (applying the reasoning from Claiborne to deny
§ 1927 sanctions for a law firm that knowingly brought a meritless suit);
Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding, upon analysis
of the statute and previous case law, that § 1927 does not apply to law firms).
20. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.
2012) (citing sister courts’ decisions and confirming that the district court had
authority to sanction a law firm); Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., 236 F.3d 443,
446 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying § 1927 sanctions of $15,000 to a law firm implicitly);
LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming
district court discretion to apply § 1927 to a law firm in issuing sanctions for the
firm’s unreasonable behavior); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir.
1991) (“A court may assess attorney’s fees against litigants, counsel, and law
firms who willfully abuse judicial process by conduct tantamount to bad faith.”);
Baker Indus., Inc., 764 F.2d at 211–12 (finding § 1927 sanctions appropriate when
a law firm agreed that a decision would be final and subsequently filed objections
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addressed this issue, although it has stated that § 1927 does not
apply to a non-lawyer party who is represented by counsel. 21
Both the legal landscape and the use of § 1927 have changed
substantially since the provision’s original enactment, calling into
question the adequacy of limiting its traditional application to
individual attorneys. 22 When Congress enacted § 1927 in 1813,
there were no law firms. 23 With more resources—more money and
manpower—most law firms today can out-litigate single-attorney
practices. 24 The large companies involved in complex litigation
sometimes retain multiple law firms rather than multiple
attorneys to handle their cases. 25 Attorneys in large law firms
today often work in teams rather than individually. 26 Many large
litigation cases today may involve whole teams of lawyers selected
and authorized by their law firm to litigate the case, which may
span years and involve hundreds of thousands of dollars in awards
and attorneys’ fees. 27 In its most conservative interpretation,
§ 1927 only reaches cases when an individual attorney,
to the decision). Cases and other texts reference “attorney’s fees” and “attorneys’
fees,” often without any apparent specific intention. See Search results for
“attorney’s fees” and “attorneys’ fees,” LEXIS ADVANCE RES., https://
signin.lexisnexis.com/lnaccess/app/signin/aci/la (sign in; then enter “attorney’s
fees” in search box; then select “Date (oldest-newest)” at “Sort by”; repeat for
“attorneys’ fees”) (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (reflecting courts’ use of “attorney’s
fees” and “attorneys’ fees” in 1791 and 1797 respectively) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48 (1991) (affirming that
nothing in § 1927’s language provides for assessing fees against a party rather
than against an attorney).
22. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text (discussing developments
that affect § 1927’s ability to achieve its purpose).
23. See infra Part II.D (relating how partnerships and solo practices
characterized the early nineteenth century legal profession).
24. See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
the modern legal landscape).
25. See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., Inc. v. Maint. Serv. Sys., Inc., 1989
WL 90274, at *3 (D. N.M. Mar. 29, 1989) (noting that two law firms represented
the plaintiff).
26. See Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72
MINN. L. REV. 697, 700 (1988) (“[M]any lawyers practicing in the largest and most
powerful American law firms now work in task-sharing teams.”).
27. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1575–76 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
that the appellant law firm’s conduct allowed discovery delays to prolong
litigation for two years, resulting in sanctions of over $1 million).
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representing a client, engages in unethical conduct; 28 today’s
practical litigation realities mean that § 1927 arguably may not
apply in large scale, high stakes litigation cases—where some of
the most egregious and expensive litigation ensues. 29
Exposing firms to sanctions for frivolous suits and vexatious
actions under § 1927 holds significant policy implications for both
firms and parties. 30 Applying § 1927 to firms would make them
accountable for the actions of their individual attorneys and
potentially allow parties to sue the deep-pocketed firms of
individual attorneys. 31 Law firms, lawyers, and federal courts
should be certain about whether § 1927 sanctions create law-firm
liability when frivolous actions are attributable to the firm.
This Note examines whether federal courts have the authority
to sanction law firms—in addition to individual attorneys—under
§ 1927. To address this question, this Note considers the
interpretation of the statute through the lens of historical and
modern applications of sanctions to law firms. 32 Part II explores
the various methods that courts use to sanction parties, attorneys,
and law firms for unethical actions that multiply litigation
proceedings. 33 Part III describes the current circuit split regarding
the application of § 1927 to law firms. 34 Part IV then suggests
28. See infra Part III.A (describing the circuit court decisions favoring this
narrow application of § 1927).
29. See, e.g., Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1575–76 (providing an example of a case
where the court awarded sanctions of over $1 million).
30. See infra Part V (considering the policy implications for sanctioning law
firms).
31. See infra Part V (noting that applying § 1927 to law firms could have
far-reaching implications for sanctions litigation). This is significant because
courts disagree about whether an individual attorney’s ability to pay the
attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to § 1927 sanctions should factor into the court’s
decision to award the full amount. See Endo, supra note 9, at 297–98 (surveying
the circuit split regarding district court consideration of an attorney’s ability to
pay). When litigation involves many lawyers at one firm or multiple firms, the
amount of attorneys’ fees awarded in § 1927 sanctions can be very high. See, e.g.,
BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 743–44 (6th Cir. 2010)
(reversing the district court’s sanctions award of over $5 million); Avirgan, 932
F.2d at 1575 (awarding over $1 million in attorneys’ fees).
32. See infra Parts II–III (discussing sanctions issued to law firms under
§ 1927, Rule 11, and the court’s inherent authority).
33. See infra Part II (examining the historical developments and case law of
sanctioning methods).
34. See infra Part III (comparing the decisions of circuit courts that favor
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possible solutions for resolving the circuit-split question regarding
the application of § 1927. 35 First, it offers judicial solutions:
encouraging circuit courts to clearly articulate their reasoning
when deciding whether or not to sanction law firms under § 1927,
and inviting a Supreme Court decision. 36 Second, it provides
legislative solutions: considering the addition of a note to the
statute, and proposing language for an amendment to the
statute. 37 Ultimately, Part V advocates that Congress amend the
statute, arguing that § 1927 should authorize district courts to
sanction law firms that engage in, or allow their attorneys to
engage in, conduct that vexatiously and unreasonably multiplies
litigation proceedings. 38
II. The History of Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation
The purpose of sanctioning parties who bring unreasonable or
vexatious lawsuits is deterrent rather than punitive. 39 Parties may
seek monetary sanctions to recoup the costs and attorneys’ fees
associated with frivolously filed and maintained suits, but not
punitive damages. 40 Depending on the sanctions mechanism and
the conduct, a court may assess sanctions against the client as a
party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s law firm. 41
applying § 1927 to law firms with those that do not).
35. See infra Part IV (providing judicial and legislative approaches to
resolving the confusion that the current circuit split has created).
36. See infra Part IV.A (outlining the possible judicial constructions of
§ 1927).
37. See infra Part IV.B (detailing the potential outcomes and viability of
legislative options).
38. See infra Part V (discussing one recommendation and its policy
implications).
39. See Endo, supra note 9, at 296–303 (basing the conclusion that § 1927’s
purpose is deterrent rather than compensatory on several circuit court opinions).
Thus, financial sanctions act more like restitution.
40. It seems fair that if a party incurs costs resulting directly from another
party’s conduct causing unreasonable delays, the transgressing party should pay
those costs. The threat of these financial reparations is meant to discourage
attorneys and parties from engaging in unethical conduct.
41. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–47 (1991) (discussing the
three sources of authority that courts possess to issue sanctions, which each allow
for different applications to parties, attorneys, or law firms).
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Federal district court local rules governing professional
conduct represent one measure for disciplining lawyers—and
firms—that act unethically. 42 Disciplinary sanctions under rules of
professional conduct take many forms but do not typically provide
parties with financial compensation. 43 The nature of these
sanctions gives parties little motivation to pursue discipline via
district court local rules because the party seeking sanctions will
not receive any compensation for its effort. 44 Additionally, most
disciplinary action under codes of professional conduct modeled on
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct applies to individual
attorneys, not to law firms. 45 Parties seeking discipline for a law
firm’s unethical actions under federal district court local rules thus
have limited incentives and options. 46
Parties seeking monetary compensation or sanctions for law
firms instead rely on other federal sanctioning authority. 47 Section
1927, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court’s
42. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 460, 463 (1996) (“In federal judicial proceedings, however, the regulation
of lawyers has been characterized by uncertainty and disharmony. The conduct
of lawyers in federal proceedings is governed by the rules of the federal, not state,
courts. The federal district courts, however, do not currently apply a uniform set
of professional rules.”).
43. See, e.g., Kirk Swanson, Opposing Former Client in Same Matter
Warrants Lawyer’s Reprimand, ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT,
CURRENT REP. (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/s/news/231f3b
138c8aeb2157296054a9de34f9/document/NXZF7C3H0JK0?highlight=swanson+
%26quot%3Bopposing+former+client%26quot%3B (last visited Nov. 19, 2016)
(reporting that the state disciplinary committee would publicly reprimand an
attorney who opposed his former client) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
44. See, e.g., Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., 556 F.3d 389, 400 (3d Cir.
2009) (“If compensation was not a recognizable basis for Rule 11 awards,
aggrieved litigants would have very little incentive to pursue sanctions thus
diminishing the important deterrent effect of Rule 11.” (quoting Brandt v. Schal
Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 1992))).
45. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N,
Discussion Draft 1983) (stating that “a lawyer,” rather than a law firm, “shall not
bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous”).
46. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (explaining why the
unsatisfactory results from state bar disciplinary bodies motivate parties to seek
sanctions elsewhere).
47. See infra Parts II.A–C (describing various sanctioning mechanisms).
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inherent authority are the three primary mechanisms federal
courts use to issue sanctions for frivolous litigation. 48 Currently,
each mechanism for sanctioning bears certain elements in common
with and unique to the others, providing overlapping tools that
courts may employ depending on the entity, conduct, litigation
stage, or type of litigation. 49
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Sanctions
This one-sentence statute has provoked significant
controversy. 50 Although rarely invoked before its amendment in
1980, § 1927 is the subject of much scholarly attention and has
generated a jurisprudential maelstrom. 51 For example, one
unresolved question is whether district courts may consider an
attorney’s financial status when issuing monetary sanctions under
§ 1927. 52 Another question concerns whether courts require actual
bad faith conduct for § 1927 to apply. 53 Other § 1927 scholarship
discusses the extent of the statute’s relationship and interaction
with Rule 11. 54 Scholars and courts have also considered whom
48. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–47 (1991) (providing an
overview of each sanctioning mechanism and its limitations).
49. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing the utilities of Rule 11, § 1927 and the court’s
inherent authority); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring that documents filed with the
court satisfy certain standards and providing for sanctions if a party fails the meet
those standards); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing for sanctions if a party violates the
rules relating to discovery).
50. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (outlining the distinct
issues addressed in § 1927 scholarship and identified by circuit splits).
51. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 9, at 293 (reviewing a circuit split regarding
whether district courts should consider an attorney’s financial status in issuing
sanctions).
52. See id. at 293–94 (examining the differing opinions regarding what
factors courts should address when issuing financial sanctions against an
attorney).
53. See Kevin J. Henderson, When Is an Attorney Unreasonable and
Vexatious?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 249, 253–64 (1988) (discussing the standards
courts have applied in finding an attorney’s actions subject to § 1927 sanctions).
54. See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights
Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 Vis-a-Vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent
Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 646–47 (2004) (observing the increased reliance
on § 1927 and inherent power as a result of Rule 11 amendments creating stricter
standards).
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courts have authority to sanction under § 1927. 55 One of these
controversies—whether courts may apply § 1927 to pro se
litigants—has resulted in a circuit split among the federal circuit
courts of appeals. 56 In other cases, courts have decided whether
§ 1927 sanctions apply to clients in addition to attorneys. 57
This Note focuses on the particular question of whether § 1927
allows courts to issue sanctions to law firms because it is the source
of growing disagreement among the federal circuit courts of
appeals. 58 In a legal landscape characterized by large firms and
litigation involving massive amounts of manpower, money, and
time, 59 the uncertain scope of § 1927 increasingly reduces its
effectiveness in achieving its stated purpose. 60 When there is doubt
55. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64 (2d Cir.
1912) (addressing the question of whether § 1927 sanctions could be applied to
clients as parties to the action); Kelsey Whitt, Split on Sanctioning Pro Se
Litigants Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927: Choose Wisely when Picking a Side, Eighth
Circuit, 73 MO. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2008) (describing a circuit split regarding
§ 1927’s application to pro se litigants).
56. See Whitt, supra note 55, at 1371 (suggesting that a pro se litigant may
be considered a “person admitted to conduct cases” under the statute). The
interpretation of “other person admitted to conduct cases” played an important
role in the question regarding pro se litigants. See id. at 1380 (arguing that § 1927
should not apply to pro se litigants because they, unlike attorneys, “do not have
to gain approval from the court before they can appear”). Whitt notes that
Congress made clear its intent that ‘‘‘other person’ covers only those admitted to
act in a lawyerlike capacity.” Id. at 1381 (quoting Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75,
80 (2d Cir. 1992)).
57. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co., 201 F. at 64 (determining that the
statute was so plain that it clearly did not apply to parties).
58. See Swanson, Wells Fargo, supra note 18 (reporting on a Ninth Circuit
opinion that deepens the circuit split regarding whether district courts may
sanction law firms under § 1927); infra Part III (describing the circuit courts’
conflicting approaches).
59. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.
2012) (assessing sanctions totaling $354,559, in which roughly $260,000 of the
sanctions award “related to litigating the sanctions motion itself”); LaPrade v.
Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (considering the
attorneys’ fees submitted by the party seeking sanctions, which the party “based
on a total of 333.5 hours of work by six partners, seven associates, two legal
assistants, and four other staffers,” totaling over $80,000); Avirgan v. Hull, 932
F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (sanctioning a law firm for over $1 million in
costs and attorneys’ fees); see also Waldman, supra note 8, at 20 (discussing an
Eleventh Circuit case involving litigation solely on the issue of sanctions for over
ten years).
60. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that § 1927’s stated
purpose is to deter the vexatious and unreasonable multiplication of suits).
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about the scope of § 1927’s authority, litigation regarding the
application of § 1927 ensues, further consuming the valuable
resources of the court and the litigants. 61
Section 1927 is over 200 years old and has remained
substantially the same during that time. 62 The statute’s stated
purpose is to deter a “multiplicity of suits or processes, where a
single suit or process might suffice.” 63 The Supreme Court in
Roadway Express v. Piper 64 stated that § 1927 “is indifferent to the
equities of a dispute and to the values advanced by the substantive
law. It is concerned only with limiting the abuse of court
processes.” 65
Although the statute contains largely the same language it did
in 1813, Congress has modified three key components of § 1927 to
clarify the statutory language and to make the statute more
practically useful to courts and litigants. 66 The three elements of
§ 1927 that Congress has amended concern: (1) to whom the
statute applies, (2) which actions it addresses, and (3) the
resulting penalties for
those actions. 67 Section 1927’s
interpretation and application have developed in tandem with its
amendments. 68
61. See infra Part III (summarizing several cases that consider whether
§ 1927 authorizes district courts to sanction law firms).
62. See infra notes 63–138 and accompanying text (detailing § 1927’s
legislative history).
63. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813) (Gales and Seaton 1854). This language
comes from a Senate decision in June 1813 to create a committee to explore
legislative solutions for addressing these issues. Id. Just over a month later,
Congress enacted the language of what is now § 1927 in the Act of July 22, 1813,
ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1813).
64. 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (considering whether § 1927 includes attorneys’
fees).
65. Id. at 762.
66. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (“When
[C]ongress amended § 1927 in 1980 to include attorneys’ fees among the category
of expenses that a court might require an attorney to satisfy personally, it made
clear that the purpose of the statute was ‘to deter unnecessary delays in
litigation.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2781, 2782)).
67. See infra notes 69–138 and accompanying text (detailing the statute’s
amendments).
68. See infra notes 69–138 and accompanying text (describing § 1927’s
evolution and its corresponding case law).
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The Congressional Act of 1813 69 created § 1927 in its original
form. 70 A Senate Committee, “appointed ‘to inquire what
Legislative provision is necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits
or processes, where a single suit or process might suffice,’” drafted
the statute. 71 The statute’s earliest language said that it applied to
“any attorney, proctor, or other person admitted to manage or
conduct cases.” 72 Parties and courts could invoke the statute when
a party’s representative multiplied proceedings “so as to increase
costs unreasonably and vexatiously.” 73 The court could require the
person violating the statute “to satisfy any excess of costs”
incurred. 74
Case law invoking this original version of § 1927 is extremely
rare. 75 The U.S. Supreme Court decided not to apply the statute in
several early reported cases that refer to it. 76 In one case, a party
69. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 21 (1813).
70. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 22 n.12 (surveying the legislative history
of § 1927). The text of the 1813 statute reads:
If any attorney, proctor, or other person admitted to manage or
conduct causes in any court of the United States, or of the
Territories thereof, shall appear to have multiplied the
proceedings in any cause before the court, so as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously, such person may be required by
order of the court, to satisfy any excess of costs so incurred.
ALFRED CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1831).
71. Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980) (quoting 26 ANNALS
OF CONG. 29 (1813) (Gales and Seaton 1854)).
72. CONKLING, supra note 70, at 8. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “proctor”
as “one appointed to manage the affairs of another or represent him in judgment.”
Proctor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (3d ed. 1933). Webster’s dictionary from
1828 defines “proctor” as “one who is employed to manage the affairs of another”
and “a person employed to manage another’s cause in a court of civil or
ecclesiastical law, as in the court of admiralty, or in a spiritual court.” Proctor,
DICTIONARY
1828—ONLINE
EDITION,
http://websters
WEBSTER’S
dictionary1828.com/Dictionary/proctor (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. CONKLING, supra note 70, at 8.
74. Id.
75. See Endo, supra note 9, at 292 (“[I]n the 150 years following its
enactment in 1813, § 1927 was invoked in only seven reported cases.”).
76. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 460,
461–62 (1856) (acknowledging that the 1813 statute supported the lower court’s
jurisdiction to grant costs, but denying review). The Court stated, “There must be
an end of litigation.” Id. at 463.
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relied on the 1813 statute, claiming that a U.S. attorney had
brought nine cases when he only should have brought one. 77 Courts
considering the statute used the terms “attorney” and “counsel”
interchangeably but did not address law firms. 78 These cases
considered the excess costs associated with the suits. 79
The Congressional Act of 1853, 80 which “standardized the
costs allowable in federal litigation,” 81 incorporated the 1813
version of the statute with only slight variations to the statutory
language. 82 In 1873, Congress codified the statute as § 982 of Title
XIII in the Revised Statutes of the United States to organize the
growing body of federal law. 83 The Judicial Code of 1911
incorporated § 982, and, in 1926, when Congress established the
first United States Code, it codified the statute as 28 U.S.C.
§ 829. 84 These versions of the statute all retained “any attorney,
77. See Field v. United States, 34 U.S. 182, 182 (1834) (reversing the lower
court’s decision on other grounds, but including in the case’s prior history the
lower court’s finding that the U.S. attorney had not unreasonably multiplied the
proceedings).
78. See, e.g., Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. at 463 (referring to the
parties’ attorneys as “counsel for the respective parties”).
79. See id. at 461–62 (restating the 1813 act, which made it “the duty of the
court to make rules or orders avoid unnecessary costs” and provided that a person
who appeared to multiply proceedings “may be required to satisfy any excess of
costs so incurred”).
80. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 162.
81. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 251 (1975)
(“[T]here was great diversity in practice among the courts and that losing litigants
were being unfairly saddled with exorbitant fees for the victor’s attorney.”).
82. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 22 n.12 (documenting § 1927’s legislative
history).
83. Section 982 stated:
If any attorney, proctor, or other person admitted to conduct
causes in any court of the United States, or of any territory,
appears to have multiplied the proceedings in any cause before
such court, so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously,
he shall be required, by order of the court, to satisfy any excess of
costs so increased.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1912) (emphasis
added). The Revised Statutes of the United States predate the United States
Code. See Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t Find in the United States Code,
40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 134–36 (2010) (describing the enactment of the
Revised Statutes in 1873 and the subsequent “updated version” published in 1878
to correct numerous errors and omissions).
84. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 255–57 (relating the
legislative evolution of § 1927’s predecessors throughout the late nineteenth and
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proctor, or other person” but omitted “manage,” instead reading
simply “admitted to conduct.” 85 The statute used “appears” rather
than “shall appear” but otherwise maintained substantially the
same language for describing sanctionable actions. 86 Instead of
“such person,” the statute provided that “he shall be required . . . to
satisfy any excess of costs,” again preserving the same meaning as
the 1813 statute. 87 The use of “he” designates the individual as
liable for the excess costs resulting from multiplied proceedings, 88
indicating that Congress at this time still contemplated parties
represented by a singular attorney.
Courts considering the statute in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries focused narrowly on whether attorneys
vexatiously multiplied proceedings “so as to increase costs.” 89 One
district court imposed limited sanctions on an attorney who waited
until “the moment of trial” to dismiss the case. 90 Another district
court decided not to sanction the attorney upon its finding that the
attorney’s multiple claims were necessarily distinct and thus not
vexatious. 91 The Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment
that counsel had multiplied the proceedings in a case involving
cross-examinations. 92 The Second Circuit refused to affirm

early twentieth centuries).
85. Motion Picture Patents Co., 201 F. at 64 (quoting the 1853 version of
§ 1927).
86. Id. See supra note 83 for the language of the amended statute that
contains the “appears to have multiplied” language.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 64 (quoting the early language of the statute); see infra notes 90–
93 and accompanying text (discussing early-twentieth century cases considering
the pre-1948 version of § 1927).
90. See Bone v. Walsh Constr. Co., 235 F. 901, 902 (S.D. Iowa 1916) (“The
only enactment by Congress of a statute intended to penalize for vexatious
proceedings is section 982 (Rev. Statutes), which permits an allowance, not
against the parties, but against the attorneys who engage in such practice.”).
91. See The Young Mechanic, 30 F. Cas. 879, 880–81 (D. Me. 1856)
(concluding that multiple claims are acceptable if each is distinct and necessary).
“[A]uthority is given, where any attorney or proctor has multiplied processes
unnecessarily and vexatiously, to require him to pay the costs himself.” Id.
92. See Toledo Metal Wheel Co. v. Foyer Bros. & Co., 223 F. 350, 358 (6th
Cir. 1915) (affirming sanctions for excessive cross-examinations of two witnesses).
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sanctions against an attorney where it found no evidence of
unreasonably increased costs in the record. 93
Congress re-adopted the statute in 1948 as § 1927 of Title 28. 94
This version dropped “proctor” from the list of entities the court
may sanction and changed “causes” to “cases.” 95 The 1948 version
of § 1927 still required that actions multiply proceedings “so as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously,” just as the previous
two versions did. 96 Congress partially modified the remedies,
allowing courts to require an offending attorney or other person “to
satisfy personally such costs.” 97 The insertion of the word
“personally” in the statute’s 1948 version came from the 1912 case
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 98 which noted that the
statute permitted a district court to order an offending attorney—
but not a complainant or defendant—to pay the excess of costs. 99
Congress apparently agreed with the Second Circuit’s statutory
interpretation. 100
Reported cases applying § 1927 between 1948 and the
statute’s most recent amendment in 1980 were still uncommon. 101
93. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 201 F. at 64 (considering whether a party
seeking sanctions had paid unnecessary costs resulting from the opposing party’s
conduct). The language in this Second Circuit opinion played a significant role in
the statute’s amendment thirty-six years later. See infra notes 98–99 and
accompanying text (elaborating on the inclusion of “personally” in the 1948
adoption of § 1927).
94. See Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1927, 62 Stat. 869, 957 (1948) (providing the
statutory version before 1980 amendment). The revised language reads: “Any
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as
to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such costs.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 201 F. 63 (2d Cir. 1912).
99. See id. at 64 (“[T]he section permits the court to order that an attorney
who has unnecessarily increased the costs shall pay personally the excess of such
costs over the amount which was properly incurred.” (emphasis added)). But see
note 193, infra, for further discussion of the implications associated with the
addition of “personally” to the statute.
100. See Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1927, 62 Stat. 869, 957 (1948) (requiring that a
sanctioned attorney personally pay costs he or she unreasonably caused to be
increased).
101. See Endo, supra note 9, at 293 (discussing the infrequence of § 1927
cases). A Lexis search revealed ninety-two federal cases citing § 1927 between
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Several circuit court decisions mentioned the statute, either in the
course of remanding a case to the district court 102 or in referencing
the court’s sources of authority for disciplining attorneys. 103 The
Second Circuit noted in one case that the court would invoke
§ 1927 if the plaintiff pursued further frivolous claims. 104 In a
Second Circuit decision from 1961, the court required the attorney
to pay court costs for “having so multiplied the proceedings as to
increase costs unreasonably.” 105 No circuit court cases from this
period discuss or sanction law firms. 106
Finally, as part of the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act
of 1980, § 1927 entered its current form. 107 The Act’s primary
1948 and 1980, a period of thirty-two years. Search results for “28 U.S.C. s 1927,”
LEXIS ADVANCE RES., https:// signin.lexisnexis.com/lnaccess/app/signin/aci/la
(sign in; then enter “28 U.S.C. s 1927” in search box; then follow “Shepardize this
document” hyperlink; then select desired date range) [hereinafter Lexis § 1927
Search] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Compare this to the thirteen-year period between 1980 and 1993, when
federal courts considered the statute in 1,782 cases. Id.
102. See, e.g., Weade v. Trailways of New Eng., Inc., 325 F.2d 1000, 1001 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (remanding a case regarding a driver’s liability to the district court for
fact-finding and conclusions of law with recommendations for methods of relief
the district court should consider, including § 1927).
103. See, e.g., Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729, 734 n.3 (3d Cir.
1962) (Biggs, J., dissenting) (noting that § 1927 allowed courts to hold counsel
liable for his or her bad acts, rather than passing the costs along to the client),
overruled by Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
104. See Weiss v. United States, 227 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1955) (denying
appellant relief based on an insurance claim she had attempted to bring four
times on similar grounds).
105. Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1961) (“Although a litigant
is ordinarily bound by the mistakes of his counsel, in this instance, we think it
would serve a better purpose to require counsel himself to pay for the
inconveniences caused by his own dilatory conduct.”).
106. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text (providing a sample of
mid-twentieth century § 1927 cases that consider sanctions against attorneys).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012), amended Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-349, § 3,
94 Stat. 1156 (enacting new language in § 1927). The statute in its current form
reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiples proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct.
Id.
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purpose in its entirety was to “expedite and reduce the cost of
antitrust litigation.” 108 Amending § 1927 was a minor feature of
the Act. 109 In hearings about this provision, advocates of the
amendment voiced their concerns about judicial reluctance to issue
sanctions. 110 The proposed amendment would have removed
“vexatiously” from the statute and made the intent standard more
explicit. 111 Ultimately, the 1980 version of § 1927 retained much of
its previous character, with slight changes. 112
In drafting the statute’s 1980 iteration, Congress preserved
the 1948 language providing that the statute applied to “[a]ny
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.” 113 Congress
did not contemplate including law firms in the 1980 amendment. 114
The 1980 amendment removed the language requiring that the
108. Pub. L. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1156.
109. The Legislature’s timely addition of attorneys’ fees to § 1927 occurred
months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roadway Express on June 23, 1980,
which held that § 1927 did not allow sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees. See
Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761 (1980) (“Roadway offers no evidence
that Congress intended to incorporate those attorney’s fee provisions into [the
pre-amendment version of] § 1927.”).
110. See Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979, S. 390: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.
60 (1979) (statement of David L. Foster) [hereinafter Hearings on Antitrust
Procedural Act of 1979] (“It is my prediction that the vast majority of district
judges will never require an attorney to pay the opposing client’s counsel fee
under the amended section.”).
111. See id. at 8 (statement of John H. Shenefield) (“[I]t would substitute for
the uncertain and restrictive intent requirement of ‘vexatiousness’ an easily
understood standard authorizing imposition of sanctions whenever unreasonable
conduct had been undertaken ‘primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing
the cost of the litigation.’”).
112. See infra notes 113–117 and accompanying text (describing the 1980
amendment).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
114. The committee hearings on the section of the bill amending § 1927 did
not raise the issue of law firms. See Hearings on Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979,
supra note 110 (discussing only the intent standard and addition of attorneys’
fees to the statute). This was likely due to two factors. First, courts had so rarely
invoked § 1927 before 1980 that Congress did not have a clear idea of how courts
and parties would enforce the amended statute. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text (noting the extremely rare application of § 1927). Second, even
if courts had more frequently utilized § 1927 sanctions before 1980, the fact that
large law firms and large-scale litigation did not exist until the mid-twentieth
century (supra Part II.A.2) would have significantly limited any jurisprudence
about the application of § 1927 to law firms.
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acting party’s conduct be motivated “so as to increase costs”; the
amended statute reads, “who so multiplies proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.” 115 Cases applying § 1927 earlier in
the twentieth century considered whether the attorney had acted
“so as to increase costs” and would not issue sanctions unless the
party’s attorney had actually done so. 116 Although the 1980
amendment of the statute no longer includes the phrase “so as to
increase costs,” courts still require bad faith on the part of the
actor. 117
Perhaps most significantly, the amended statute included
expenses and attorney’s fees in the sanctions the court may
issue. 118 Before the 1980 amendment, the monetary penalties
arising out of § 1927 sanctions were relatively small. 119 The
inclusion of attorney’s fees caused § 1927 sanction awards amounts
to increase dramatically, incentivizing parties to make § 1927
motions and to litigate the validity of § 1927 motions brought by
opposing parties, and increasing § 1927’s usage. 120
As the number of cases considering § 1927 sanctions gained
momentum throughout the 1980s, 121 the issue of whether § 1927
applied to law firms began to gain traction. Before the Third
115. § 1927; see also Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761 (1980)
(finding that, before its 1980 amendment, § 1927 did not allow courts to assess
attorneys’ fees). Compare this with the pre-1980 language of the statute, supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64 (2d Cir.
1912) (refusing to affirm sanctions where the record contained no evidence of
increased costs).
117. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding
that an attorney must act with bad faith for § 1927 sanctions to apply). The
application of the bad faith standard is one of the ongoing controversies associated
with § 1927.
118. See § 1927 (stating that an attorney or other person “may be required by
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct” (emphasis added)).
119. See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 (observing that a party could not recoup
attorneys’ fees, which are typically the largest costs incurred in a lawsuit, under
§ 1927 before 1980).
120. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 252 (noting that very little litigation
resulted in § 1927 sanctions before the statute’s 1980 amendment because the
sanction amounts were usually insignificant).
121. See Lexis § 1927 Search, supra note 101 (noting that federal courts
reviewed sanctions under § 1927 1,782 times between 1980 and 1993). Of those
1,782 cases, 1,505 cases date from after 1985. Id.
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Circuit’s decision in Baker Industries, Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd. 122 in
1985, several district courts had considered and sanctioned law
firms under § 1927. 123 Other district courts considered but declined
to issue sanctions against firms based on their finding that the
moving party did not show that opposing counsel had met the
requisite bad faith standard. 124
In the years after Baker, there were several other significant
Supreme Court and circuit court decisions regarding whom courts
may sanction under § 1927. 125 In 1980, the Supreme Court held
that § 1927 did not extend to non-lawyer parties represented by
counsel; it did not consider law firms. 126 In 1990, in Blue v. U.S.
Department of the Army, 127 the Fourth Circuit noted that courts
often rely on several overlapping sanctions mechanisms but,
nevertheless, declined to sanction the party’s law firm. 128 In 1991,
Avirgan v. Hull 129 affirmed the application of § 1927 against a law
firm. 130 These cases did not analyze whether the text of § 1927
explicitly included law firms. 131
Rule 11’s revision in 1993 motivated parties and courts to rely
more frequently on § 1927. 132 The 1993 version of Rule 11 still in
122. 764 F.2d 204, 206 (3d Cir. 1985) (sanctioning a law firm under § 1927).
123. See, e.g., Wold v. Minerals Eng’g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D. Colo.
1983) (ordering that the law firm acting as counsel for defendant “pay the
reasonable expenses,” “including a reasonable attorney’s fee”); Glover v. Libman,
578 F. Supp. 748, 769 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (assessing sanctions against a law firm and
its clients pursuant to pre-1993 Rule 11, § 1927, and a local court rule for
vexatiously seeking to disqualify the opposing party’s counsel).
124. See, e.g., In re Silverman, 13 B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(deciding not to retroactively award attorneys’ fees sanctions against a law firm
after § 1927’s amendment).
125. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–47 (1991)
(considering whether Rule 11 and § 1927 negated the court’s inherent authority
to issue sanctions).
126. See id. at 48 (addressing the question of whether the court could issue
§ 1927 sanctions against a party for its bad faith conduct).
127. 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990).
128. See id. at 536, 549 (determining, after a thorough assessment of available
sanctions, to affirm only some of the sanctions imposed by the district court).
129. 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 1582–83 (deciding that the party’s lead counsel and official law
firm were liable pursuant to several sanctions rules).
131. See Blue, 914 F.2d at 549 (challenging the sanctions on their merits).
132. See Matthew G. Vansuch, Icing the Judicial Hellholes: Congress’ Attempt
to Put Out “Frivolous” Lawsuits Burns a Hole Through the Constitution, 30 SETON
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effect today applies to law firms but its safe harbor provision 133
created a chilling effect on its usage, leading to greater reliance on
§ 1927. 134 Increased utilization has multiplied the issues related to
the application of § 1927. 135 Although the circuit split regarding
the application of § 1927 to law firms represents only a tiny
fraction of cases addressing § 1927, it reveals the range of conduct
that courts may sanction under § 1927. 136 Despite the numerous
§ 1927 cases 137 and the range of issues they raise, Congress has not
amended § 1927 since 1980. 138
B. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Several Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts with
authority to issue sanctions against participants in civil cases
distinct from § 1927. 139 Rule 37 140 addresses discovery issues

HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 311 (2006) (noting the increased reliance on § 1927 and the
court’s inherent authority following the 1993 revision to Rule 11). In an American
Bar Association journal article from 1988, Gregory P. Joseph observed that
“[b]efore the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 and all of the attendant publicity on
litigation abuse, virtually no one knew that [§] 1927 existed.” Gregory P. Joseph,
Rule 11 Is Only the Beginning, 74 A.B.A. J. 62, 62 (1988).
133. See infra note 155 and accompanying text (describing the safe harbor
provision, which gives parties an opportunity to resolve issues with filings).
134. There have been nearly 7,000 § 1927 cases since Rule 11’s amendment
in 1993. Lexis § 1927 Search, supra note 101. In the past two decades (1996-2016),
courts have decided seventy times the number of § 1927 cases considered in the
thirty years between 1948 and 1980. See Lexis § 1927 Search, supra note 101
(illustrating the scarcity of early § 1927 cases).
135. See, e.g., Whitt, supra note 55, at 1365–66 (discussing the development
of a circuit split related to whether pro se litigants should be sanctioned under
§ 1927).
136. See infra Part III (detailing the cases involved in the current circuit split
regarding whether § 1927 authorizes district courts to sanction law firms).
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that § 1927 has
appeared in just under 7,000 cases since 1993).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (reflecting the unchanged language of the
1980 amendment).
139. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (describing the requirements for filing papers
with the court); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (enumerating the procedures for sanctioning
discovery actions in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which
addresses discovery).
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.

A FIRM LAW FOR SANCTIONS

2155

within the system of sanctions, 141 but Rule 11 and § 1927 more
closely resemble each other and courts often draw parallels
between them. 142 Rule 11 provides very specific requirement for
documents filed with the court. 143
While the rules have many similarities to § 1927, courts
should employ them as distinct sanctions mechanisms. 144 For
example, the scope of conduct subject to sanctions under § 1927 is
broader than that of Rule 11. 145 In addition to the text of the rule,
courts may use the Advisory Committee notes accompanying each
amendment of the rule to help construe the rule’s application. 146
When considering § 1927, courts are limited to the statute’s text
and the precedent established by its case law. 147 The legislative
histories of Rule 11 and Rule 37 further underscore the differences
between § 1927 and the Federal Rules. 148
141. See id. (providing guidelines for parties and courts regarding civil
discovery and sanctions for failure to provide discovery materials).
142. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41–47 (1991)
(considering the characteristics of Rule 11 and § 1927).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (describing the procedural and substantive
requirements for all papers filed with the court).
144. See, e.g., Philip Talmadge et al., When Counsel Screws Up: The
Imposition and Calculation of Attorney Fees as Sanctions, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
437, 451 (2010)
Despite the apparent similarity of § 1927 to Rule 11, the two rules have
significant substantive and procedural differences and cannot be
imposed as an alternative to one another. . . A court may find cause to
impose sanctions under Rule 11 while finding no cause to impose
sanctions under § 1927.
145. See id. (“[Section 1927] is not triggered by the mere filing of frivolous
claims; instead, it imposes a continuing restraint upon an attorney’s conduct
throughout the course of the proceedings.”). By contrast, Rule 11 requires at least
one attorney to sign pleadings, written motions, and other documents submitted
to the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). The attorney’s signature certifies that, to the
best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief, the document presents a
proper purpose and brings nonfrivolous claims that have evidentiary support. Id.
at 11(b). Frivolous and unsubstantiated claims may result in court-imposed
sanctions. Id. at 11(c).
146. See, e.g., Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 248 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“Some guidance can be found in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 11, which
offer a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to this determination.”).
147. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the statute’s development and
application).
148. See infra notes 149–168 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
distinctive characteristics of Rules 11 and 37).
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In comparison to § 1927, which Congress enacted before the
existence of law firms in 1813, the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective in 1938 in a legal landscape more
similar to today’s. 149 Rule 11 has undergone several significant
changes. 150 In 1983, Congress adopted a revised version of Rule 11
that led to a proliferation of Rule 11 litigation. 151 Congress revised
Rule 11 in 1993 to limit abuse of the rule and to address the
question of whether Rule 11 applied to law firms as well as
attorneys. 152 Before its 1993 amendment, Rule 11 did not explicitly
include law firms. 153
Although Congress broadened Rule 11 to include law firms,
Rule 11’s so-called “safe harbor” provision, also added in 1993, has
made parties less inclined to rely on Rule 11. 154 The safe harbor
149. See Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 435, 436 n.8 (1958) (noting “the initial adoption of the rules on December
20, 1937 (effective on September 16, 1938)”).
150. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993 amendments
(describing the purpose of the 1993 changes to the rule in response to the abuse
of the 1983 version).
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1983 amendments
(stating that the amendment’s purpose was improving the rule’s deterrent
effects).
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993 amendments
(“This revision is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the
interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule.”). The rule provides
that
if, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated
the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a
violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (emphasis added).
153. Compare Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126
(1989) (concluding that because the 1983 version of Rule 11 did not explicitly refer
to law firms, a law firm could not be sanctioned under Rule 11), with FED. R. CIV.
P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendments (noting that Rule 11
sanctions “should be imposed on the persons—whether attorneys, law firms, or
parties—who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be responsible
for the violation”). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the rule did not apply to law
firms in Pavelic & LeFlore. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 (finding that
the rule’s language limited its application to the individual signer). This decision
appears to be the catalyst for the rule’s 1993 amendment.
154. See Vansuch, supra note 132, at 311 (discussing the Rule 11 revisions
that made it more difficult to get court sanctions).
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provision provides parties with twenty-one days to correct any
defects in their filings before the opposing party may file its motion
for sanctions. 155
While the safe harbor provision effectively cut back on Rule 11
sanctions, it also encouraged courts and attorneys to pursue
sanctions under § 1927 or the court’s inherent authority. 156 These
other sanctioning mechanisms do not have comparable limitations
in the form of safe harbor provisions, thus allowing parties to seek
sanctions without giving the offending party an opportunity to
resolve the alleged issue. 157 The absence of a safe harbor provision
in § 1927 reinforces the need for § 1927 to be clear and its scope
certain, as counsel has no opportunity to correct defects under
§ 1927.
Rule 37 enforces Rule 26, 158 which provides for discovery
procedures and scope, 159 primarily through sanctions. 160
Amendments to both rules and several others became effective
December 1, 2015. 161 Neither Rule 26 nor Rule 37 specifically
address law firms. 162 The Advisory Committee notes from the 2010
amendment of Rule 26 state that protected communications
between an expert and “the party’s attorney” often should “not be
limited to communications with a single lawyer or a single law
firm.” 163 The words “law firm” do not appear in the text of Rule
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s
notes to 1993 amendments (emphasizing the importance of the “safe harbor”
rule).
156. See Vansuch, supra note 132, at 311 (noting that the 1993 revision of
Rule 11 has increased sanctions litigation in other areas).
157. See supra Part II.A (exploring § 1927’s development and application);
infra Part II.C (discussing the court’s inherent authority to issue sanctions).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
159. See id. (providing parameters for disclosing information to opposing
parties in civil suits).
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (enumerating the consequences for failing to disclose
information under Rule 26).
161. See Agnieszka A. McPeak, Social Media, Smartphones, and Proportional
Privacy in Civil Discovery, 64 KAN. L. REV. 235, 251 n.114 (2015) (noting the
effective date and anticipating the effects of the amendments).
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (requiring “a party” to disclose certain information
upon the request of the opposing party); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (referring to the parties’
responsibilities and the liabilities associated with failure to provide required
discovery).
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2010 amendment.
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37. 164 Taking its provisions individually, courts have not applied
Rule 37 sanctions to law firms. 165
Rule 11 and Rule 37 provide courts with alternatives to § 1927
sanctions, but these alternatives cannot serve as substitutes for
§ 1927. 166 Instead, the rules inform the broad scope of conduct to
which § 1927 may apply. 167 The constraints of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not represent the sole alternative to § 1927 for
sanctioning frivolous litigation. 168
C. Inherent Authority to Issue Sanctions
Inherent authority gives courts the power to sanction law
firms. 169 Neither § 1927 nor Rule 11 displace the courts’ inherent
authority to issue sanctions. 170 Although courts prefer to invoke
established rules or statutes, they have long maintained the power
to impose sanctions pursuant to their inherent authority. 171 This
power allows courts to issue sanctions at their discretion when
164. An examination of Rule 37 revealed that the rule’s only mention of “firm”
is in reference to a party’s relationship with an “outside firm.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
165. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir.
1988) (“By its express terms, Rule 37(c) applies only to a party.”). Apex Oil
considered whether Rule 37(c) can be applied against “a party’s attorney,” but the
appellant in that case was a law firm. See id. at 1011 (“The law firm of Shea &
Gould appeals from Judge McLaughlin’s orders imposing monetary sanctions on
it for alleged abuses during pretrial discovery in a suit against its client . . . .”).
Here, the Second Circuit seemed to conflate the concepts of attorney and law firm.
166. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text (noting that courts
should treat the rules and § 1927 as distinct).
167. See supra notes 139–166 and accompanying text (comparing Rule 11’s
application to law firms and its comparatively narrow scope to § 1927).
168. See infra Part II.C (describing the court’s inherent power to issue
sanctions).
169. See Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“There is no serious dispute that a court may sanction a law firm pursuant to its
inherent power.”).
170. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (finding no basis
for the “scheme of the statute and the rules” to displace the court’s “inherent
power to impose sanctions”); Joseph, supra note 132, at 64 (“The murkiest, and
most extensive, power to sanction derives from the inherent power of the court.”).
Joseph notes that “[t]he inherent power to sanction is staggeringly broad.” Id.
171. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“Certain implied powers must necessarily
result to our [c]ourts of justice from the nature of their institution.” (quoting
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812))).
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parties engage in bad-faith conduct or when other sanctions
mechanisms are not available. 172 Courts tend to invoke inherent
power reluctantly, in cases where “offending parties have practiced
a fraud upon the court.” 173
In comparison to the narrow scope of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the nearly infinite potential breadth of the court’s
inherent power, § 1927 serves an important role. 174 It provides
courts with standards for identifying a wide range of sanctionable
conduct, including conduct identified in Rules 11 and 37. 175
However, both Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority allow
courts to sanction firms, 176 while the application of § 1927 to law
firms remains uncertain. 177 This uncertainty prolongs litigation,
negating the deterrent purpose of the statute. 178
D. Lawyers and Law Firms in the Context of § 1927
In light of the circuit split regarding whether § 1927 applies to
law firms, 179 it is important to consider lawyers and law firms in
historical context. 180 The concept of lawyers has changed
dramatically over the last two centuries. 181 When the original text
172. See id. at 50 (“[W]hen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation
that could be adequately sanctioned under the [Federal] Rules, the court
ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than the inherent power.”).
173. Id. at 42 (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124
F.R.D. 120, 139 (W.D. La. 1989)).
174. See infra notes 175–176 and accompanying text (discussing § 1927’s
specific application in comparison with other sanctioning mechanisms).
175. For example, the Second Circuit found that § 1927 may apply to law
firms engaging in discovery abuses, which is significant because Rule 37 sanctions
do not encompass law firms. Compare Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855
F.2d 1009, 1019 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming § 1927’s application in the context of
discovery abuse), with FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing for discovery abuse sanctions
against an attorney, but not a law firm).
176. See supra Parts II.B–C (observing courts’ authority to sanction firms).
177. See infra Part III (introducing the divided decisions of the circuit courts).
178. See supra Part II.A (discussing § 1927’s purpose to deter unreasonable
litigation).
179. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit court’s reasoning for and against
applying the statute to law firms).
180. See infra notes 181–190 and accompanying text (examining the historical
developments of lawyers and law firms in the United States).
181. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
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of § 1927 referenced attorneys, proctors, or other persons admitted
to conduct cases in 1813, the standards for qualifying as one of
these were much lower than they are today. 182 For a short period
of time in the early nineteenth century, states distinguished
between common law attorneys and solicitors or counselors, who
could practice in equity court. 183 Law schools and formal written
bar exams developed as the legal industry grew. 184 Notably, the
establishment of the Patent Office and the growth of corporations
in the mid-nineteenth century demanded lawyers, precipitating an
increase in practicing attorneys. 185
Likewise, law firms are a relatively new addition to the legal
system. 186 Until the late nineteenth century, attorneys practiced
alone or in two-attorney partnerships. 187 These partnerships were
subject to partnership liability, suggesting that the partners
shared liability for any sanctions. 188 The first law firms came into
(2005) (detailing the development of American law from the Colonial Era to the
present, including standards for lawyer education and practice).
182. See id. at 235–37 (describing the requirements for admission to the bar,
which varied by state). There was no law school requirement and few states had
strict prerequisites. Id. at 236 (explaining New Hampshire’s county bar standards
between 1805 and 1833, which mandated “five years of preparation for admission
to the lower courts,” in comparison with Massachusetts in 1836, which “obliged
courts to admit anyone of good moral character who had studied law three years
in an attorney’s office”). Even the bar admission process was more lax. Id. at 236–
37 (describing anecdotal accounts of several lawyers gaining admission to the bar
after a half hour of questioning by a judge).
183. See id. (noting that New York and Virginia both subscribed to these
distinctions).
184. See id. at 238–41 (elaborating on the development of university law
schools, which began to gain momentum in the mid-nineteenth century).
185. See id. at 325–26 (observing that a few attorneys and law firms built
their fortunes on patent cases after Congress established the Patent Office in
1836, which led to an increased number of patents and a corresponding increase
in patent litigation).
186. See id. at 232 (noting that, in the 1830s, there was “a handful of two-man
partnerships, but no firms of any size”).
187. See Thomas Paul Pinansky, The Emergence of Law Firms in the
American Legal Profession, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 593, 594 (1986) (discussing
the development of lawyer partnerships into law firms over the course of the
nineteenth century).
188. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law
Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 329, 339 n.46 (1995) (“Under the principles of
partnership law, partners in firms share unlimited liability for the acts or
omissions of partners in the scope of the partnership business.”).
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being after the Civil War. 189 Even then, firms did not become a
common form of legal practice until the mid-twentieth century. 190
Thus Congress did not contemplate law firms when it enacted the
original text of § 1927 in 1813 or the 1853 version of the statute,
because firms simply did not exist. 191
In 1980, Congress again did not contemplate law firms in the
amendment of § 1927.192 This was due to the scant case law
regarding § 1927.193 Testimony from the hearings on the bill also
indicated skepticism about whether courts would utilize the
amended § 1927.194 Given the statute’s rare and unlikely
189. See Pinansky, supra note 187, at 594–95 (noting that, before the Civil
War, “the private organization of legal work rarely went beyond the traditional
two-man office”).
190. See Eli Wald, The Rise of the Jewish Law Firm or Is the Jewish Law Firm
Generic?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 885, 888 (2008) (“In 1948, there were 248 law firms
in the United States with eight or more partners . . . .”). In 2005, law firms with
six or more lawyers accounted for nearly a quarter—well over 11,000—of the over
47,000 law firms in the United States. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS:
YEAR 2015 at 1 (2015). According to the American Bar Association, 49% of private
practitioners had solo practices in 2005. Id.
191. See supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text (establishing that law
firms did not exist when Congress enacted the law).
192. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the legislative intent of the 1980
amendment to § 1927).
193. See Endo, supra note 9, at 293 (noting that courts invoked the early
versions of § 1927 only seven times in its first 150 years). This may also explain
why Congress did not amend § 1927 to include law firms in 1948 when it adopted
the statute. The addition of “personally” in 1948 may support the contention that
§ 1927 should apply only to individual attorneys. See supra Part II.A (noting that
the source of “personally” in the 1948 version of § 1927 was Motion Picture
Patents). It may also be construed, given the context of Motion Picture Patents, to
distinguish the legal representative from the litigant. See Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1912) (differentiating the award of “costs,”
which a litigant may pay, from “excess of costs” accrued as a direct result of an
offending attorney’s unreasonable and vexatious conduct, which the attorney
must pay). The statute’s purpose, the Motion Picture Patents court concluded, was
“to punish the pettifogger, or at least, to make him pay the expenses occasioned by
his misconduct.” Id. at 64 (emphasis added). A Seventh Circuit decision provides
support for this latter interpretation of “personally.” See 1507 Corp. v. Henderson,
447 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971) (“In our opinion the section does not deal with
the question of the nature or amount of costs to be allowed, but authorizes
imposition of otherwise allowable costs on counsel personally in place of the party
for whom he appeared . . . .”). The use of term “counsel” is interesting because it
can also refer to law firms. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d
204, 211–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming district court sanctions against a party’s
counsel—in this case, a law firm).
194. See Hearings on Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979, supra note 110
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application, it is not surprising that Congress in 1980 did not
consider expanding the scope of § 1927 to include law firms. Today,
§ 1927’s more frequent application and the significant role law
firms play in high stakes complex litigation make § 1927 ripe for
an amendment that clarifies its scope.
III. Circuit Split Regarding § 1927’s Application to Law Firms
Several federal circuit courts of appeals disagree about
whether § 1927 allows courts to sanction law firms. 195 This
disagreement has resulted in a circuit split between the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts, which have decided that § 1927
does not include law firms, 196 and the Second, Third, Eighth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Courts, which
have permitted district courts to sanction law firms under
§ 1927. 197 When directly considering the issue of whether § 1927
should apply to law firms, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits analyzed the issue as one of first impression. 198 Several of
(statement of David L. Foster) (suggesting that judges would not issue sanctions
against attorneys). This problem extended beyond § 1927; “[b]ecause of the
asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys who abuse the discovery
rules, Rule 26(g) makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose
appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s notes to 1983 amendment (citations omitted).
195. Compare Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th
Cir. 2015) (finding that § 1927 does not reach law firms), BDT Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 757 (6th Cir. 2010) (same), and Claiborne v.
Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005) (same), with Enmon v. Prospect
Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012) (deciding that the district court
had authority to sanction a law firm under § 1927), LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same), Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572,
1582–83 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), and Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764
F.2d 204, 211–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
196. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding that § 1927’s language expressly includes attorneys rather than law
firms).
197. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir.
1985) (applying § 1927 sanctions to the firm that represented the party in
opposing conclusions reached by a referee that the parties agreed would have final
authority).
198. See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“[W]e have not previously addressed whether a law firm may be
considered an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.’”).
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the circuits imposing sanctions on law firms, in comparison,
treated the statute as if its scope implicitly reached law firms. 199
A. Circuits Not Applying § 1927 to Law Firms
The circuit courts holding that § 1927 applies only to “any
attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases” 200 base their
decisions upon several factors. 201 First, the courts consider the
statute’s plain language and their own precedent. 202 Second, they
look to their sister courts for persuasive guidance. 203 Third, the
courts consider whether Rule 11 developments presented a similar
question. 204 Finally, the courts address whether lower courts may
sanction law firms by any other means. 205
These courts interpreted the statute’s language to mean that
§ 1927 does not provide for imposing sanctions against a law
firm. 206 The plain language of § 1927 expressly includes only
attorneys and other persons “admitted to conduct cases.” 207 In
2005, in Claiborne v. Wisdom, 208 the Seventh Circuit found that a
law firm did not satisfy either of these express categories. 209 The
199. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc., 764 F.2d at 208 (finding that § 1927
“provides for the assessment of sanctions directly against counsel”).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
201. See, e.g., Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–23 (considering the statute’s
language, interpretations by other circuit courts, and Rule 11 case law).
202. See, e.g., Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1293 (noting that its own previous
interpretations of § 1927 limited the statute’s application to attorneys and other
individuals).
203. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005)
(examining the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’ decisions regarding whether § 1927
applies to law firms).
204. Id. (drawing a parallel between the current text of § 1927 and the
Supreme Court’s finding that the text of Rule 11 excluded its application to law
firms).
205. See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 751–52
(6th Cir. 2010) (analyzing whether the district court abused its discretion in
applying its inherent authority after determining that § 1927 did not apply to the
law firm).
206. See, e.g., Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–23 (deciding whether § 1927’s plain
language included law firms).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
208. 414 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005).
209. See id. at 722–23 (finding that law firms were neither attorneys nor
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court implicitly rejected the idea that “law firm” could be
incorporated into the concept of “attorney.” 210 Instead, the Seventh
Circuit focused on whether a law firm qualified as a “person
admitted to conduct cases” and dismissed that premise as “too
much of a stretch.” 211 In 2010, the Sixth Circuit, in BDT Products
v. Lexmark International, Inc., 212 included a large excerpt of the
Claiborne decision in its opinion and reached a similar
conclusion. 213 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits, failed to find any congressional intent to
include law firms within the meaning of § 1927. 214
In making their rulings, these circuit courts considered the
precedent set by their own previous interpretations of § 1927. 215
BDT Products looked to Sixth Circuit dicta stating that § 1927 did
not allow district courts to sanction law firms. 216 Noting that it was
not bound by its dicta, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless found its
previous statement “sufficiently persuasive” 217 and used it to
“admitted to conduct cases”).
210. See id. (discussing only the second part of the statute’s introductory
clause).
211. See id. (“The fact that § 1927 refers to ‘other persons’ admitted to conduct
cases is of no help to the defendants. This language reflects the fact that in limited
circumstances non-attorneys may appear in judicial proceedings.”).
212. 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010).
213. See id. at 751 (“Even if firms can admittedly be personified in a literary
sense through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under
the statute. More importantly, law firms are not ‘admitted’ to ‘conduct cases’ in
court.”).
214. See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir.
2015) (“We believe that if Congress had intended to permit federal courts to
impose sanctions against law firms pursuant to [§ 1927], it would have included
an express authorization to do so in the statute.”). Recall that § 1927 has changed
very little since its enactment before the existence of law firms and that parties
invoked it infrequently until its most recent amendment added attorneys’ fees to
its list of remedies. See supra Part II.A (relating the statutory development of
§ 1927 and its historical context).
215. See, e.g., Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1293–94 (referring to previous decisions
for its construction of the statute); BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 750 (considering
a previous Sixth Circuit case that included a comment regarding § 1927 sanctions
against firms in its dicta).
216. See BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 750 (“[Section] 1927 does not authorize
the imposition of sanctions on a represented party, nor does it authorize the
imposition of sanctions on a law firm.” (quoting Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus.,
Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009))).
217. Id. (quoting PDV Midwest Ref., L.L.C. v. Armada Oil & Gas Co., 305 F.3d
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bolster the BDT Products decision denying the application of
§ 1927 to law firms. 218 In Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 219 the
Ninth Circuit analogized sanctioning law firms to two other Ninth
Circuit cases to support its narrow interpretation of the statute. 220
In the first case, the Ninth Circuit had denied a district court
authority to sanction a financial consultant employed by attorneys
in a case. 221 In the second case, the Ninth Circuit had overturned
a § 1927 sanction imposed “jointly on counsel and the client”
because “§ 1927 authorizes sanctions only upon counsel.” 222
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits also looked to their
sister courts for persuasive guidance in determining whether
§ 1927 applies to law firms. 223 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
it must conduct its own independent analysis after noting that
two circuit courts had imposed sanctions on law firms “without
any discussion of the question” 224 and another “expressed
doubt.” 225 The Ninth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Claiborne, holding that Congress intended § 1927 to
apply only to attorneys or other individuals. 226 It looked to the
498, 510 (6th Cir. 2002)).
218. See id. (concluding that, although the court had not directly ruled on the
question, it could follow its own dicta regarding § 1927’s application to firms).
219. 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015).
220. See id. at 1293 (describing previous Ninth Circuit decisions construing
§ 1927).
221. See FTC v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 799 F.2d 507, 508–10 (9th Cir.
1986) (remanding the district court’s issuance of sanctions against an attorney
without proper notice, and agreeing that § 1927 authorizes recovery “only from
an attorney or otherwise admitted representative of a party,” against a
non-attorney financial consultant).
222. See Sneller v. City of Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 640 (9th Cir. 2010)
(refusing to issue § 1927 sanctions jointly imposed upon the party and its counsel
after the sanctioned party corrected its motions pursuant to Rule 11’s safe harbor
provision).
223. See infra notes 224–228 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit
courts’ findings regarding their sister court interpretations of § 1927).
224. Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (referring to
decisions from the Third and D.C. Circuits).
225. Id. (citing Blue v. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 549 (4th Cir. 1990)).
226. See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he ‘specificity and precision’ of § 1927, allowing for sanctions only
against ‘attorneys’ or ‘other persons admitted to conduct cases[,]’ was designed to
exclude sanctions against a law firm.” (quoting Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen,
980 F.2d 1307, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 1992))).
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Sixth Circuit’s opinion in BDT Products for further confirmation
of its analysis 227 and reviewed contradictory decisions from the
Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits with skepticism. 228
In reaching the conclusion that § 1927 operates with a more
limited scope, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits considered
whether Rule 11’s developments provide any guidance for
interpreting § 1927. 229 In 2005, the Seventh Circuit found that its
decision not to apply § 1927 to law firms was “consistent” with
the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Enterntainment Group. 230 Five years later, the Sixth Circuit
incorporated the Rule 11 analysis from Claiborne directly into its
opinion. 231 In Kaass Law, the Ninth Circuit likewise agreed with
the Seventh Circuit’s finding that “[t]he language of § 1927 raises
exactly the same problem as the earlier version of Rule 11” and
relied heavily on the Claiborne coverage of Rule 11. 232
227. See id. (noting the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that “28 U.S.C. § 1927 does
not authorize the imposition of sanctions on law firms” (quoting BDT Prods., Inc.
v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2010))).
228. See id. at 1294–95 (finding the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’
reasoning unpersuasive). In Kaass Law, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
Second and Eleventh Circuits “conflated” § 1927 sanctions on law firms with
those authorized by the court’s inherent power. Id. The Kaass Law court also
observed that the Third Circuit “sanctioned a law firm pursuant to [§ 1927] before
[Rule 11] was amended to include law firms explicitly, and did not address the
limited statutory language of [§ 1927].” Id.
229. See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (considering a similar
question about whether a previous version of Rule 11 applied to law firms).
230. 493 U.S. 120 (1989). See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th
Cir. 2005) (“Even if Pavelic & LeFlore does not strictly dictate the outcome here,
it points strongly in the direction we have taken.”).
231. See BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 751 (6th Cir.
2010) (“Our sister circuits have come to differing conclusions without focusing on
the precise legal question at stake . . . . [T]hese decisions are inconclusive. We
therefore consider for ourselves whether a law firm is subject to sanctions under
§ 1927.” (quoting Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–23)).
232. See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir.
2015) (including an entire paragraph of the Claiborne decision within the
opinion’s text). In 1989, the Supreme Court decided that the existing (pre-1993)
version of Rule 11 did not apply to law firms. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (reversing the lower court’s decision to
uphold Rule 11 sanctions against a law firm). Congress subsequently amended
Rule 11 to expressly include law firms in its language. See supra Part II.B
(detailing Congress’s revisions to Rule 11). This response to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Pavelic & LeFlore may be an indication that Congress would amend
§ 1927 if the Supreme Court found that it did not apply to law firms, which seems
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit alone addressed whether lower
courts may sanction law firms by any other means in its
discussion of whether district courts may apply § 1927 to law
firms. 233 The court in Claiborne concluded that courts may have
authority for such sanctions under state law, Rule 11, and the
court’s inherent power, precluding the need for § 1927 to apply to
law firms. 234 While both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
acknowledged that Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority
allow district courts to sanction law firms, they did not consider
this a factor in favor of the narrow interpretation of § 1927. 235 The
Sixth Circuit examined whether or not a district court abused its
inherent power by sanctioning the law firm in the case, but did
not directly address the Claiborne court’s point about its
obviating effect. 236 The Ninth Circuit also focused narrowly on the
question of § 1927. 237
These circuit courts were aware of other courts’ decisions to
sanction law firms under § 1927. 238 In Claiborne, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that many district courts “have held or
assumed that sanctions may be imposed against a law firm.” 239 The
Ninth Circuit addressed the opinions of the Second, Third, and
to conflict with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit rulings.
233. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (reviewing the alternative
means available for sanctions); cf., e.g., BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 751–52
(reviewing a district court’s error in applying § 1927 and its abuse of discretion in
exercising its inherent authority without mentioning other alternative sources for
law firm sanctions).
234. See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 724 (noting that Indiana common law may
allow courts to hold law firms liable, that the 1993 version of Rule 11 “expressly
permits sanctions against ‘the attorneys, law firms, or parties,’” and that “the
defendants never mention the court’s inherent power”).
235. See infra notes 236–237 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
consideration given to the alternative means of sanctioning law firms in BDT
Products and Kaass Law).
236. See BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 751–52 (considering the district court’s
application of its discretion in applying its inherent authority to sanction a law
firm).
237. See Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294–95 (analogizing the 1983 version of
Rule 11 to § 1927 and refusing to consider sanctions under the court’s inherent
authority because the party did not request those sanctions at the district court
level).
238. See infra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (addressing the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit analyses of the conflicting opinions from other courts).
239. Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Eleventh Circuits, noting the reasons it disagreed with their
conclusions. 240 Concluding that the language of § 1927 clearly
excludes law firms and finding support in the analogous
jurisprudence of Rule 11, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
chose not to consider the broader context of § 1927. 241
B. Circuits Applying § 1927 to Law Firms
In contrast, over the past three decades, several other federal
circuit courts of appeals have applied § 1927 to law firms. 242 In
reaching the conclusion that § 1927 authorizes federal district
courts to issue sanctions against law firms, the Second, Third,
Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits consider the issue very
differently from their sister courts. 243 Of the federal circuit courts
applying § 1927 sanctions to law firms, the Third, Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits make no distinction between law firms
and individual attorneys in their analyses. 244 The Second Circuit
alone distinguishes law firms from individual attorneys, following
the precedents set by other circuit courts’ earlier decisions but
incorporating additional analysis. 245
The Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit decisions
predate the circuit court decisions narrowly construing the
240. See Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (9th
Cir. 2015) (finding that the opposing sister courts had either conflated sanctioning
powers or failed to address the statutory language § 1927).
241. See supra notes 200–240 and accompanying text (interpreting the
statute based on language, precedent, persuasive authority, and the comparable
Rule 11 case law).
242. See Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012)
(affirming sanctions against a law firm under § 1927); LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572,
1582–83 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d
204, 211 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
243. Compare Baker Indus., Inc., 764 F.2d at 208 (analyzing § 1927’s “bad
faith” requirement without directly addressing the distinction between law firm
and attorney), with Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 721–23 (considering the specific
question of whether § 1927 may apply to a law firm as a case of first impression).
244. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc., 764 F.2d at 208 (addressing the merits of the
sanctions rather than the district court’s authority to issue § 1927 sanctions
against a law firm).
245. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148 (deciding whether district courts may
sanction a law firm for an individual attorney’s actions).
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statute 246 and the more recent Second Circuit decision affirming
its application explicitly to law firms. 247 In these early cases, 248
three factors buttress affirming the district courts’ application of
§ 1927. 249 First, the law firms appealed the district court’s award
of sanctions on the merits rather than directly challenging the
district court’s authority under § 1927 to award sanctions against
a law firm. 250 Second, the circuit courts used “attorney” and
“counsel” interchangeably, citing the language of the statute and
referring to the offending law firm as a party’s “counsel.” 251 Third,
in two cases, the court applied § 1927, Rule 11, and the court’s
inherent authority jointly. 252 These similarities provide a starting
point for the early jurisprudence regarding the application of
§ 1927 to law firms.
The first federal circuit court to affirm the application of
§ 1927 to law firms was the Third Circuit in Baker. 253 The law firm
246. The Seventh Circuit decided Claiborne in 2005, twenty years after Baker.
Compare Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005), with Baker Indus.,
Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit decided BDT
Products in 2010, and the Ninth Circuit decided Kaass Law in 2015. Kaass Law
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015); BDT Prods., Inc. v.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010).
247. The Second Circuit decided Enmon in 2012, twenty-seven years after
Baker. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012).
248. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Avirgan
v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764
F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985).
249. See infra notes 250–252 and accompanying text (noting the appellant’s
arguments and the circuit courts’ reasoning in response).
250. See, e.g., Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir.
1985) (“[The firm] contends that its reliance on [cases in support of its position]
was reasonable, thus barring a finding of willfulness and bad faith as a matter of
law.”).
251. See, e.g., id. at 212 (examining the text of § 1927, noting the importance
of an “attorney’s obligation to the court,” and reviewing the bad faith actions of
counsel to determine whether the actions met the required standard).
252. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In its
clarification order, the district court explained that Daniel Sheehan, as lead
counsel, and the Christic Institution, as the official law firm, were liable pursuant
to the bad-faith exception, [§ 1927], and [Rule 11] . . . .”).
253. See Baker Indus., Inc., 764 F.2d at 208 (affirming the district court’s
§ 1927 sanctions against a law firm in 1985). In the case, the appellant’s law firm,
Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, filed a 101-page brief supporting its objections after
agreeing that the special master’s decision would be final. Id. at 207–08. The court
duly read the document, and respondent filed a thirty-six-page response to the
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did not challenge the district court sanctions on the grounds that
the district court lacked authority under § 1927 to sanction the
firm. 254 Instead, it appealed, contending that the firm’s objections,
which had multiplied the proceedings, were reasonable and thus
should not be sanctioned. 255 The Third Circuit used the term
“counsel” in place of “attorney” several times in its opinion. 256 It
noted that the district court found the actions of appellant’s
counsel—the law firm—frivolous and vexatious. 257 The Third
Circuit concluded that the district court “properly imposed
attorneys’ fees and costs against [the firm of] Cravath under
[§ 1927].” 258
Six years after Baker, the Eleventh Circuit similarly affirmed
district court sanctions under § 1927 against a party’s law firm
without considering the statute’s technical limitations. 259 Rather
than challenging the sanctions directed against the official law
firm, the primary parties and their attorneys appealed sanctions

objections, as well as a forty-three-page response to appellant’s legal
memorandum. Id. at 208.
254. See id. at 210 (reviewing Cravath’s arguments on appeal, which all dealt
with the merits of the sanctions).
255. See id. (summarizing Cravath’s contentions that its objections “were
based on the referee’s erroneous legal rulings” and were supported by a line of
other circuit court cases).
256. See id. at 208 (“Baker moved for an award of counsel fees pursuant to
[§ 1927].”). In its analysis, the Third Circuit also used “attorney” and “offending
attorney.” Id. at 209.
257. See id. at 208 (stating the district court’s finding “that Cravath’s conduct
in asserting [the position that the referee’s legal conclusions were reviewable] was
sufficiently vexatious to justify the award of attorneys’ fees directly against it
under [§ 1927]”).
258. Id. at 212.
259. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A court may
assess attorney’s fees against litigants, counsel, and law firms who willfully abuse
judicial process by conduct tantamount to bad faith.”). This case involved a RICO
claim that the “attorneys for the plaintiffs, The Christic Institute, must have
known prior to suing that they had no competent evidence to substantiate.” Id. at
1581 (quoting Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). The lead
attorney in the case filed an affidavit that “was the impetus for the two years of
discovery” that “did not yield any witnesses who could link the alleged criminal
enterprise to the bombing.” Id. at 1582. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding. See id. at 1582–83 (“Since [the lawyer, law firm, and primary
parties] chose not to abandon this case, the district court properly awarded
attorney’s fees and costs to the appellees.”).
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of over $1 million on the merits. 260 The Eleventh Circuit had the
opportunity to distinguish between the “lead counsel” and the
“official law firm” for sanctioning purposes, and the court treated
them indistinguishably. 261 The circuit court affirmed the district
court’s joint application of three sanctions mechanisms—§ 1927,
Rule 11, and the court’s inherent authority—to both entities. 262
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit likewise agreed that district courts
could impose sanctions on law firms. 263 The appellant law firm
appealed its sanctions on the merits, contending that the district
court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion. 264 In its
consideration of the appeal, the D.C. Circuit quoted directly from
the district court opinion to support affirming the sanctions
against “plaintiff’s counsel.” 265 The circuit court subsequently used
the term “offending attorney” in addressing the bad faith
requirement for § 1927, but it drew no distinction between
“counsel” and “attorney” in upholding the sanction. 266
260. The appellants argued that the district court had improperly granted
summary judgment, “erred in issuing certain orders prior to summary judgment,”
and erred in awarding sanctions. Id. at 1577.
261. See id. at 1582 (reflecting the court’s identical treatment of lead counsel
and the law firm while distinguishing the court’s treatment of the parties). The
parties, counsel, and law firm appealed the district court’s order. Id. at 1577. The
Christic Institute, the appellant law firm, “is a tax-exempt law firm which funded
the litigation.” Id. at 1577 n.3.
262. See id. at 1582 (combining its analysis of the sanctions upon appellant
law firm, lawyer, and parties). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
sanctions against the parties under the court’s inherent authority via the
“bad-faith exception.” Id.
263. See LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(affirming the district court’s sanctions against a law firm that sought a stay of
arbitration in state court without telling the state court of the federal court’s stay
of litigation due to an existing arbitration agreement between the parties). The
appellant law firm had delayed arbitration proceedings for over three years. See
id. at 901 (noting the initial federal district court stay of litigation in 1992, the
subsequent commencement of arbitration in 1995, its further delay and the state
court stay of arbitration in 1996). The district court’s order cited the “vexatious
and dilatory tactics” of the appellant law firm. Id. at 900.
264. See id. at 902–07 (dismissing the appellant law firm’s arguments that
the district court lacked jurisdiction and abused its discretion in imposing
sanctions).
265. See id. at 905 (“[T]he court ordered, ‘pursuant to [§ 1927], that plaintiff’s
counsel, the law firm of Liddle & Robinson, shall compensate [defendants], for the
vexatious and dilatory tactics of plaintiff’s counsel . . . .”).
266. See id. at 906 (“According to the language of [§ 1927], the district court
must find that ‘the offending attorney’s multiplication of the proceedings was both
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Finally, in 2001, the Eighth Circuit implicitly held that § 1927
allows district courts to sanction law firms, but it has yet to directly
address the question. 267 In Lee v. First Lenders Insurance
Services, 268 the appellant law firm challenged the district court’s
sanctions as improper and the award amount as an abuse of the
court’s discretion. 269 The Eighth Circuit, like its sister circuits,
used “counsel” and “attorney” interchangeably and affirmed the
sanctions against the law firm. 270
Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corporation, 271 decided in 2012,
represents the most recent circuit court decision favoring the
broader application of § 1927. 272 In Enmon, the Second Circuit—
alone among the circuit courts in explicitly applying § 1927 to law
firms—analyzed whether the statute authorizes district courts to
sanction law firms as well as attorneys. 273 The decision upheld
Second Circuit precedent established in Apex Oil Company v.
‘unreasonable’ and ‘vexatious.’’” (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Hosp., 38
F.3d 1414, 1416–17 (5th Cir. 1994))).
267. See Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., 236 F.3d 443, 445–46 (8th Cir. 2001)
(affirming § 1927 sanctions against a law firm, finding that the firm’s conduct
“multiplied the proceedings . . . vexatiously and unreasonably” and that the
imposition of sanctions was not an abuse of the court’s discretion).
268. 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001).
269. See id. at 445–46 (addressing the law firm’s argument that the district
court should have pursued Rule 11 sanctions instead of sanctions under § 1927).
270. See id. at 445 (noting that “[s]anctions are proper under § 1927 ‘when
attorney conduct, viewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless
disregard of the attorney’s duties to the court’” (quoting Lee. v. C.B. Sales, Inc.,
177 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 1999))). The court also gave substantial deference to
the district court because of “that court’s ‘intimate familiarity with the case,
parties, and counsel.’” Id. (quoting O’Connell v. Champion Int’l Corp., 812 F.2d
393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987)).
271. 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012).
272. The notable circuit court decisions extending § 1927 to law firms date
from 2001, 1998, 1991, 1988, and 1985. See First Lenders Ins. Servs., 236 F.3d at
446 (applying § 1927 sanctions to a law firm); LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co.,
146 F.3d 899, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1575
(11th Cir. 1991) (same); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1012
(2d Cir. 1988) (same); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 206 (3d
Cir. 1985) (same). But see Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290,
1291 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that § 1927’s language does not authorize district
courts to sanction law firms).
273. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 147–48 (discussing the inherent authority,
precedent, district court practice, and sister courts’ decisions as support for
affirming the imposition of § 1927 sanctions on the law firm).
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Belcher Company of New York 274 and was also inclusive of
favorable sister court decisions. 275 In addition, the decision
appeared to be responsive to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’
narrow construction of the statute. 276
In its analysis, the Second Circuit supported its conclusion
that a law firm may be liable for the actions of one of its attorneys
with five assertions. 277 First, the circuit court concluded that
district courts have authority to sanction law firms under § 1927
in the same way that they have authority via their inherent
power. 278 Second, the court pointed to its own precedent. 279 Third,
274. 855 F.2d 1009, 1011–12 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions under § 1927
for discovery abuse).
275. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148 (“The practice of imposing § 1927 sanctions
on law firms has also been approved by our sister circuits.”).
276. The Sixth and Seventh Circuit decisions holding that § 1927 does not
extend to law firms date from 2010 and 2005, respectively, predating the 2012
Enmon decision. See BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 744
(6th Cir. 2010) (vacating sanctions against a law firm); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414
F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
277. See Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2012)
(considering the reasons for upholding the district courts assessment of
sanctions).
278. See id. at 147 (noting that the district court had “imposed sanctions
pursuant to both its inherent powers and § 1927” and affirming the imposition of
sanctions on the law firm in the case). Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Second
Circuit in Enmon found that
the only meaningful difference between an award made under § 1927
and one made pursuant to the court’s inherent power is . . . that
awards under § 1927 are made only against attorneys or other persons
authorized to practice before the courts while an award made under
the court’s inherent power may be made against an attorney, a party,
or both.
Id. at 144 (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986)). The
Second Circuit also appeared to decide that “attorney” and “law firm” were
synonymous for the purposes of applying § 1927. See id. at 147 (stating that “a
court may sanction a law firm pursuant to its inherent power” and saw “no reason
that a different rule should apply to § 1927 sanctions”).
279. See id. (“[I]n any event, we have previously upheld the award of § 1927
sanctions against a law firm.”). The precedent-setting Second Circuit case is Apex
Oil, in which the court affirmed applying § 1927 sanctions against a law firm for
discovery abuse. Apex Oil Co., 855 F.2d at 1020. This decision, like other early
federal circuit court of appeals decisions that affirmed district court authority to
sanction law firms under § 1927, did not directly address the law firm question
but instead focused on the application of Rule 37 and § 1927 in the context of
discovery abuse. See id. at 1014–20 (finding that, although Rule 37 did not
encompass law firms, the district court could sanction a law firm abusing the
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the court noted that district courts in the Second Circuit have
sanctioned law firms pursuant to § 1927, which, while not binding,
could be persuasive. 280 Fourth, the court selectively recognized the
concurring opinions of its sister circuits. 281 Fifth, the court agreed
that the district court properly held the law firm liable for the
principal attorney’s actions. 282 Based on these conclusions, the
Second Circuit stated that “nothing in the language of [§ 1927], in
our case law regarding that statute or a district court’s inherent
powers, or in counsel’s actions in this case leads us to think that
the District Court was without authority to impose sanctions on
[the law firm] as a whole.” 283
The court in Enmon did not answer the same question posed
to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 284 In Enmon, appellants
challenged both the § 1927 and inherent power sanctions issued by
the district court on the grounds that a court may not sanction a
firm as a whole for an attorney’s actions. 285 The appellants in
discovery process under § 1927). It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit
in Apex Oil distinguished “attorney” and “law firm” for the purposes of sanctions
under Rule 37, but not for § 1927, suggesting the court’s inclination to more
broadly interpret statutes than rules.
280. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 147–48 (“[W]e would upset a relatively
long-standing practice among district courts in our Circuit if we were to hold that
law firms may not be sanctioned under § 1927 for the acts of certain attorneys.”).
The Enmon court referenced three federal district court cases. See id. (noting
cases from the Southern and Northern Districts of New York in 2008, 1997, and
1995).
281. See id. at 148 (citing the Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit opinions that
affirm § 1927’s application to law firms).
282. See id. (agreeing with the district court’s assessment that the attorney’s
“actions were indistinguishable from those of Arnold & Itkin as a firm” and that
“the firm consistently accepted responsibility for conducting the underlying
litigation”).
283. Id.
284. See infra notes 285–287 and accompanying text (distinguishing the
Second Circuit’s approach to applying § 1927 from that of the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits).
285. See Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)
(observing the appellant law firm’s challenge “on the grounds that [the district
court] improperly sanctioned the law firm as a whole, rather than sanctioning
[the lead attorney] and the other individual attorneys who participated directly
in the litigation”). The Second Circuit stated that it disagreed “with Arnold &
Itkin’s assertion that the District Court was without authority under [§ 1927] to
award sanctions against the ‘firm as a whole’ for the ‘actions of various lawyers.’”
Id.
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Claiborne, in comparison, appealed only the question of whether
the district court could issue a joint and several sanctions award
against a law firm under § 1927. 286 The appellant law firm in BDT
Products challenged the district court’s sanctions on the grounds
that § 1927 did not grant district courts authority to sanction law
firms. 287 These distinctions indicate that there may be multiple
ways to frame the issue of § 1927’s application.
Several other circuit courts have not yet addressed the
question of whether § 1927 applies to law firms. 288 The Fourth
Circuit heard a case that raised the issue, but avoided addressing
it by dealing with a threshold question. 289 The First Circuit
similarly avoided the question of whether the district court had
firm-sanctioning authority under § 1927 by deciding cases on other
grounds. 290 This third undecided category of circuit courts
underscores the significance of the current circuit split; without
resolution, these circuits will have to choose which interpretation
of § 1927 to adopt, further deepening the split.
Five circuit courts have affirmed § 1927 sanctions against law
firms, while three have not. 291 If the Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits directly addressed the question of whether § 1927
286. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005)
(addressing the district court’s authority to sanction a law firm jointly and
severally under § 1927).
287. See BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750–51 (6th
Cir. 2010) (considering whether the district court erred in its award of sanctions).
288. See, e.g., Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 549 (4th Cir. 1990)
(avoiding the question of whether § 1927 applies to law firms). The First, Fifth,
Tenth, and Federal Circuit Courts have not yet addressed this question.
289. See id. (reversing § 1927 sanctions in their entirety and thus not
reaching the question of whether § 1927 applied to the law firm). Notably, the
Fourth Circuit did not reject the district court’s authority to issue sanctions
against the law firm, instead expressing doubt and considering the question of
whether the sanctions were appropriate. Id.
290. See, e.g., Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 68 (1st Cir. 2008)
(finding that no § 1927 sanctions were available for the appellant law firm’s
specific actions but not specifically addressing whether the court could sanction a
firm under § 1927); United States v. Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999)
(affirming sanctions against a firm because the lower court cited both the court’s
inherent power and § 1927, allowing the circuit court to sidestep a § 1927
analysis).
291. See supra notes 242–287 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit
court decisions favoring the broader application of § 1927); Part III.A (detailing
the circuit court decisions opposing § 1927’s application to law firms).
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authorizes district courts to sanction law firms, these circuits
would likely affirm their precedents and expressly apply § 1927 to
law firms. 292 The statute’s effectiveness as a deterrent depends
upon courts applying it consistently, so that counsel can predict
when it may or may not be liable for sanctions. The current version
of § 1927 has caused confusion among the circuit courts, reducing
its effectiveness. Resolving the circuit split will increase the courts’
ability to apply § 1927 consistently to law firms and, consequently,
enhance the statute’s deterrent effect.
IV. Strategies for Resolving the Application of § 1927 to Law
Firms
There are three ways to resolve the existing circuit split. 293
First, consensus and clarity among the federal circuit courts of
appeals represent a possible solution. 294 Second, the Supreme
Court could also grant certiorari and address the issue. 295 Third,
legislative alternatives include adding a note to the statute or
amending § 1927 to clarify its scope. 296
A. Judicial Resolution
Until Congress acts to clarify § 1927, federal courts have
interpretive authority and may continue to decide whether § 1927
applies to law firms. 297 Circuit court interpretations are binding on
the district courts within the circuit. 298 Only Congress or a decision
292. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir.
2012) (referring to its precedent to bolster the court’s opinion).
293. See infra Parts IV.A–B (suggesting judicial and legislative methods of
resolution).
294. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the unlikely possibility that the circuit
courts will agree on the application of § 1927 to law firms without a ruling from
the Supreme Court or a legislative amendment).
295. See infra Part IV.A.2 (elaborating on the Supreme Court’s consideration
of § 1927).
296. See infra Part IV.B (describing how a statutory note or amendment could
resolve the circuit split regarding the application of § 1927 to law firms).
297. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
298. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the
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from the Supreme Court can compel the circuit courts to treat
§ 1927 uniformly with regards to law firms. 299 Both congressional
action and Supreme Court intervention are unlikely while the
circuit split remains unclearly articulated. 300 A consensus among
the divided circuit courts is also unlikely, given the stances already
articulated and judicial respect for precedent.
1. Clear Circuit Court Interpretation
One possible solution is consensus among the circuit courts.
Currently, three circuit courts favor a narrow interpretation of
§ 1927, while five circuit courts have sanctioned law firms
pursuant to § 1927. 301 Several circuit court decisions imposing
§ 1927 sanctions on law firms lack desired clarity or analysis. 302
Thus, these courts, by directly addressing the question of whether
§ 1927 may extend to law firms, may arrive at a result that does
not expressly conflict with their precedent. The Second Circuit’s
decision in Enmon poses a significant obstacle to achieving a
consensus among the circuit courts against § 1927’s application to
law firms because its analysis and decision were very clear. 303
Even if the circuit courts will not apply § 1927 sanctions
according to the same narrow standard, definitive decisions from
the circuit courts will add clarity and will encourage congressional
or Supreme Court intervention. 304 Deepening the split among the
federal circuit courts of appeals is one way to motivate the
Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1143, 1216 (1999) (noting the enforcement hierarchy among the federal
courts).
299. See id. (describing how Congress and the Supreme Court may place
restrictions on lower court judgments in the context of federal habeas corpus).
300. See infra Part IV.A.1 (suggesting that circuit courts engage in textual
analysis and consider the policy implications associated with § 1927).
301. See supra Part III (elaborating on the circuit split and the reasoning
utilized by the circuit courts on either side of the split).
302. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits’ implicit extension of § 1927 to law firms).
303. See supra notes 271–283 and accompanying text (reviewing the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Enmon).
304. To compel circuit courts to address the question directly, sanctioned
firms must appeal and challenge district court authority to sanction law firms
under § 1927.

2178

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2135 (2016)

Supreme Court to grant certiorari 305 and to bring the issue to
Congress’s attention. 306 In reviewing lower court judgments,
circuit courts can help to clarify the meaning of § 1927 by writing
clear and decisive opinions analyzing the statute’s language and
purpose. 307 If the Third, Eight, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, along
with the undecided circuit courts, clearly state that § 1927
authorizes district courts to sanction law firms, the circuit split
could motivate Supreme Court resolution or congressional action.
Circuits that have considered whether § 1927 applies to law
firms should continue to follow their precedent. 308 Based on the
issues raised by the circuit split, 309 undecided courts should adopt
the broader construction of § 1927. The undecided circuit courts
should conclude that, while § 1927’s text suggests a narrower
statutory construction, the statute’s historical context and purpose
support finding that § 1927 applies to law firms. Although this
approach conflicts with the interpretation of the statute based on
its plain language 310 along with the arguably analogous Rule 11
precedent from the Supreme Court 311 and appears to ignore the
lack of analysis from the circuits that have applied § 1927 to law
firms, 312 it is the better approach.

305. See, e.g., Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759–64 (1980)
(resolving a circuit split regarding the awarding of attorneys’ fees under § 1927).
306. Congress added the word “personally” to § 1927 because of the Second
Circuit’s decision in Motion Picture Patents. See § 1927 statutory notes (noting
the source of the new language).
307. See, e.g., Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005)
(providing a thorough analysis of the construction of § 1927 and concluding that
it does not give district courts authority to sanction law firms).
308. See supra Part III (identifying the three circuit courts that have
construed § 1927 narrowly and the five circuit courts that have applied § 1927 to
law firms).
309. See supra Part III (distinguishing the circuit court decisions favoring a
narrower interpretation of § 1927 from those applying a more expansive
construction of the statute).
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (applying to “any attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases”).
311. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s holding that the pre-1993 version of Rule 11 did not apply to law firms).
312. See supra Part III.B (surveying the circuit court decisions that have
extended the application of § 1927 to law firms and noting apparent implicit leaps
or conflated terms).
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If no circuit consensus occurs, even well-reasoned circuit court
decisions cannot ultimately provide a definitive outcome regarding
the interpretation of the statute and are therefore only useful for
inducing more long-term solutions. A clearly defined circuit split
can motivate the Supreme Court to help clarify controversial
statutory interpretation issues.
2. Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court could grant certiorari to hear a case
regarding the question of district court authority to sanction law
firms pursuant to § 1927. In Pavelic & LeFlore, when deciding
whether Rule 11 applied to law firms, the Court stated that its
“task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” 313 Although Rule
11 and § 1927 are distinct sanctions mechanisms, 314 it is possible
that the Supreme Court may construe the statute narrowly, as it
did with Rule 11. 315
Although this outcome may not provide the desired resolution
for the circuit split in the short term, a Supreme Court decision
with which Congress disagrees may lead Congress to respond by
amending the statute. 316 If the Supreme Court pursues a
conservative, text-based approach to interpreting whether § 1927
applies to law firms, congressional intervention seems likely based
on Congress’s past interest in § 1927’s utility and in Rule 11’s
application to law firms. 317
It is also possible, given the potential abuses of § 1927 and the
changes in legal climate between 1993 and today, 318 that the
313. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989).
314. See supra Parts II.A–B (noting the differences between § 1927 and Rule
11).
315. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126 (holding that, because the
pre-1993 version of Rule 11 did not explicitly include law firms, it did not apply
to them).
316. See supra Parts II.A–B (discussing the changes made to § 1927 and Rule
11 as a direct result of Supreme Court decisions with which Congress disagreed).
317. See supra Parts II.A–B (documenting the legislative amendments
enacted after the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express and Pavelic &
LeFlore).
318. See supra Part II (considering the Rule 11 and § 1927 amendments and
the corresponding developments in practices of seeking sanctions under the rule
and statute).
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Supreme Court may find, in line with five circuit courts, that
§ 1927 grants district courts law firm-sanctioning authority. In
either case, while a Supreme Court ruling is the standard means
of resolving a circuit split, the Court selects its docket and is
unlikely to hear a case dealing with this § 1927 issue soon. 319
B. Legislative Solutions
Instead of letting the federal courts resolve the existing circuit
split, Congress could take action. This approach puts control in the
hands of the Legislature. Two possibilities exist: adding a note to
§ 1927 or amending the statute itself. 320
1. Add a Note to the Statute
Many federal statutes have statutory or editorial companion
notes. 321 Editorial notes accompany most sections of the U.S.
Code. 322 These notes often relate the “historical and revision”
information pertaining to the statute. 323 They also reflect notes

319. See Karen Rubin, Ninth Circuit Agrees Law Firms Are Not “Persons” for
§ 1927 Sanctions; Circuit Split Deepens, THOMPSON HINE: L. FOR LAW. TODAY (Oct.
29, 2015), http://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2015/10/law-firms-are-notpersons-no-sanctions-in-ninth-circuit-under-%C2%A7-1927/ (last visited Dec. 11,
2016) (noting that “[i]t is possible that the now-deepened [circuit] split will
prompt Supreme Court review—eventually”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
320. See infra Parts IV.B.1–2 (discussing potential legislative solutions).
321. See Detailed Guide to the United States Code Content and Features, OFF.
L. REVISION COUNS., http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml#statutory (last
visited Dec. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Detailed Guide] (differentiating between the
types of notes that follow statutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
322. See id. (observing that these “notes are prepared by the Code editors to
assist users of the Code”).
323. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 notes (2012) (providing the historical origin of
§ 1927 and documenting the sources of specific changes); 28 U.S.C. § 1911 notes
(2012) (noting that Congress added the second paragraph of the statute governing
Supreme Court fees to give “statutory sanction to existing practice”).
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about specific amendments. 324 Statutory notes contain a provision
of federal law and can sometimes encompass an entire act. 325
Notes following U.S. Code sections differ from Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee notes. 326 In addition to
detailing a rule’s amendment history, federal rule Advisory
Committee notes provide guidance for courts applying the rule by
examining how a specific change attempts to address past
issues. 327 By comparison, U.S. Code section notes represent an
objective record of the changes to a statute. 328 Adding an editorial
note to a statue merely provides context and background, while a
statutory note is law that courts must enforce. 329
If Congress adds a note to § 1927, it may help courts interpret
the statute. For example, an editorial note might define or provide
a reference for “attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases.” 330 A statutory note defining “attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases” 331 could potentially resolve the circuit
split, but it seems unlikely that Congress would want to set these
definitions in stone given the changing standards and roles of
attorneys over time. 332 An editorial note could also clarify whether
324. See, e.g., § 1927 (describing the changes in the statute’s 1980
amendment); 28 U.S.C. § 1915 notes (2012) (listing each subsequent amendment
for the amended subsections, focusing on particular word changes).
325. See Detailed Guide, supra note 321 (“[W]hether a provision in an
act . . . appears in the Code as a section or as a statutory note is an editorial
decision based on a number of factors.”); see also, e.g., Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 notes (2012) (containing additional provisions in the body of
the notes, including the Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009, Pub.
L. 111-83, Title, V § 565, 123 Stat. 2184 (2012)).
326. See infra notes 327–328 and accompanying text (discussing the objective
nature of federal statute notes compared to Federal Rules of Civil Rules advisory
committee notes).
327. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes on 1993
amendments (noting the past failings of the rule’s “interpretation and
application” and providing both a broad overview of the rule’s principle and more
detailed remarks for specific subsections).
328. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 statutory notes (documenting the statutory
word changes for successive amendments).
329. See Detailed Guide, supra note 321 (distinguishing between the two
types of notes).
330. § 1927; see Detailed Guide, supra note 321 (stating that notes can define
terms).
331. § 1927.
332. See supra Part II.D (discussing the development of lawyers and law
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courts should treat “admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof” 333 as a clause that modifies
both “attorney” and “other person.” Additionally, a new note could
state the purpose of the statute 334 and address whether
sanctioning law firms conflicts or concurs with that purpose. None
of these editorial note suggestions will achieve a circuit split
resolution. 335
Adding a note with any legal significance will require the same
level of congressional intervention, with less comprehensive
results, as amending the statute. 336 Unless Congress adds a
statutory note to the statute, the note will have little influence on
resolving the circuit split. Thus, Congress should amend the
language of § 1927 instead of simply modifying the statute’s notes.
2. Amend Title 28 with Clearer Language
Another solution for resolving the divided interpretations of
§ 1927 is to amend the statute. Congress should amend the statute
either to expressly include law firms, like Rule 11, 337 or to foreclose
the sanctioning of law firms. Congress has amended § 1927
responsively in the past when lawmakers either agreed or
disagreed with court rulings. 338 In 1980, significant salient, timely
firms).
333. § 1927.
334. This would give Congress the opportunity to clarify whether it intends
§ 1927 to be deterrent or punitive.
335. See Detailed Guide, supra note 321 (distinguishing the authority of
editorial and statutory notes).
336. Congress votes to adopt the text of statutory notes the same way it enacts
legislation. See Detailed Guide, supra note 321 (noting that “[a] provision of a
Federal statute is the law whether the provision appears in the Code as a section
or as a statutory note”).
337. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (reflecting the 1993 revisions proposed by the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and approved by the
Supreme Court and Congress); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to
1993 amendment (noting that the rule applies to law firms, which may be jointly
and severally liable for their attorneys’ conduct).
338. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 notes (2012) (reflecting the Legislature’s agreement
with the Second Circuit’s decision in Motion Picture Patents to hold sanctioned
attorneys personally liable). The 1980 amendment of § 1927 also illustrates
Congress’s immediate reaction to the Supreme Court decision that § 1927 did not
allow courts to award attorneys’ fees in Roadway Express. See supra Part II.A
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legislation allowed Congress to include the amendment of § 1927
in the body of a much larger act. 339
The current circuit split indicates that the existing plain
language of the statute is not clear. 340 This Note proposes language
for both possible interpretations of § 1927, denying district courts
authority to sanction firms and granting them that authority. In
its proposed text, this Note strives to maintain the integrity of the
statute. 341
This proposed language would exclude law firms from § 1927
sanctions:
Any individual attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously
may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.

The addition of “individual” will help to clarify the intention that
courts sanction only individuals, rather than law firms. This small
change would make it more difficult for parties and courts to argue
that the statute includes law firms. This proposed language has
the advantage of bearing a strong resemblance to § 1927’s existing
text. 342
Alternatively, based on the model established in the 1993
amendment of Rule 11, 343 the following proposed language would
include law firms:
(noting the legislation’s timing and purpose).
339. See Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-349, § 3,
94 Stat. 1156 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1311) (enacting legislation to
limit abuses in antitrust litigation).
340. See supra Part III (describing the conflicting decisions among circuit
courts regarding § 1927’s application to law firms).
341. See supra Part II.A (noting the constants within § 1927 over its 200-year
life). These proposed amendments do not contemplate any of the other
controversies surrounding § 1927’s application. See supra Part II.A (discussing
the existing scholarship and case law concerning § 1927).
342. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (comprising the exact language above
without the proposed changes).
343. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court may impose an appropriate
sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible
for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held
jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or
employee.”).
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The court may require any attorney, or other person admitted
to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any
Territory thereof, or any law firm, who so multiplies or allows
multiplication of the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously to satisfy, either personally or jointly, the excess
costs,
expenses,
and
attorneys’
fees
reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.

Because a law firm as an entity is not “admitted to conduct cases,”
the placement of “law firm” comes after this clause. The phrase “or
allows multiplication of the proceedings” provides for cases in
which an attorney acts on behalf of his or her law firm. 344 “Either
personally or jointly” resolves the ambiguity regarding whether
“personally” limited § 1927 to individual attorneys. 345
Statutory amendments require congressional passage; the last
amendment to § 1927 occurred in 1980. 346 It seems unlikely that
Congress will soon amend an apparently minor statute to resolve
an issue that affects only law firms involved in federal cases. 347 But
if the circuit split continues to deepen, the Supreme Court rules on
the issue contrary to Congress’s intent, or a particularly relevant
piece of legislation arises, 348 Congress may take action. 349
V. Recommendation that § 1927 Should Apply to Law Firms
This Note argues that Congress should amend § 1927 to
include law firms to accomplish the statute’s purpose in the context
344. See supra Part III.B (noting the Second Circuit’s consideration in Enmon
of whether a law firm should be liable for an attorney’s actions).
345. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (considering the significance of
the word “personally” in the context of § 1927).
346. See supra Part II.A (discussing the 1980 addition of attorneys’ fees to
§ 1927).
347. Recall, however, that over half the lawyers in private practice now
practice in law firms. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (reviewing the
growth of law firms).
348. See supra Part II.A (noting Congress’s incorporation of § 1927 into the
1980 Antitrust Procedural Improvement Act just after the Supreme Court decided
Roadway Express).
349. The question of whether § 1927 includes law firms is not the only issue
related to § 1927; if Congress amends the statute, it should also consider other
questions of § 1927’s application. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the debates
regarding whether to consider an attorney’s ability to pay assessed sanctions and
whether § 1927 includes pro se litigants).
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of the modern legal landscape, the current circuit split, and the
resulting confusion about the scope of § 1927’s application. The
purpose of § 1927 is to deter the abuse of court process and
unnecessary multiplication of suits. 350 Large firms dominate the
litigation landscape today, and teams of lawyers shepherd major
litigation through years and sometimes decades of court process. 351
This litigation can involve several million dollars in fees and lead
to a decade of dispute solely on the issue of sanctions. 352
Depending on the interpretation of § 1927 in a particular
circuit, law firms may avoid liability when they are responsible for
unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying proceedings. 353 Section
§ 1927 cannot deter these large firms and lawyer teams from
behaving unethically in their clients’ interests if the statute does
not authorize courts to sanction firms. Furthermore, the statute’s
intended deterrent effect weakens when attorneys and firms are
not certain whether they may be liable for engaging in certain
conduct.
Parties and their legal counsel should be able to predict who
will be accountable when the court finds that one side has acted
unreasonably or vexatiously. If § 1927 applies only to individual
attorneys, each attorney may exercise more care when pursuing
certain actions. 354 Alternatively, if § 1927 includes law firms, firms
may be more reticent to expose themselves to sanctions liability
and may more carefully direct their attorneys. 355 To achieve
350. See supra Part II.A (describing the original impetus for enacting the
statute in 1813 and its subsequent application).
351. See supra Part II.D (examining the modern practices of law firms in
comparison to early solo practices or partnerships).
352. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (providing examples of
sanctions amounts and highlighting the extended litigation resulting from § 1927
sanctions).
353. Law firms—like attorneys—wish to avoid liability, creating the potential
for litigation pursued solely on the issue of winning or appealing sanctions
awards. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 20 (noting one unresolved case, “[d]espite
[ten] years of litigation on the sole issue of sanctions” and an “enormous amount
of judicial resources”).
354. This was the Supreme Court’s argument in favor of a narrow Rule 11
construction in Pavelic & LeFlore. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp.,
493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989) (“[T]here will be greater economic deterrence upon the
signing attorney, who will know for certain that the district court will impose its
sanction entirely upon him . . . .”).
355. See id. (“To be sure, the partnership’s knowledge that it was subject to
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certainty and promote § 1927’s effectiveness, either Congress or
the Supreme Court needs to clarify the law.
One argument in favor of retaining the more limited
interpretation of § 1927 is that the current version of Rule 11 and
the court’s inherent power to issue sanctions negate the need for
§ 1927. 356 Because Rule 11 and the court’s inherent power give
courts authority to sanction law firms, 357 § 1927 is arguably an
unnecessary addition to these existing sanctions mechanisms. The
statute’s scope can sometimes include the conduct sanctionable by
Rule 11. 358 In those rare, narrow cases, it might seem redundant
for both Rule 11 and § 1927 to authorize sanctions against a law
firm because Rule 11 is already available. Furthermore, in cases
where Rule 11 does not apply, inherent authority serves as a
comprehensive sanctions mechanism, encompassing some of
§ 1927’s sanctionable conduct in particularly egregious cases. 359 If
courts can invoke their inherent authority to sanction firms for all
actions, it might seem like there is no need to rely on § 1927. 360
This Note contends, however, that the power to sanction law
firms under Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority indicates
unequivocally that § 1927 should apply to law firms. The
firm-sanctioning power these other sanctioning mechanisms
possess clearly demonstrates Congress’s and the courts’
recognition that some law firm actions compel sanctions to achieve
deterrence. 361

sanction might induce it to increase ‘internal monitoring . . . .’”).
356. The circuit courts favoring a narrower construction of § 1927 appear to
favor this argument. See supra Part III.A (describing circuit court decisions that
advocate relying upon Rule 11 or the court’s inherent authority to issue sanctions
to law firms).
357. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Second and Eleventh Circuits’
recognition that the 1993 version of Rule 11 and the court’s inherent authority
give district courts the power to sanction law firms).
358. See supra Parts II.A–B (elaborating on the situations and cases in which
§ 1927 overlaps with Rule 11).
359. See supra Part II.C (discussing the court’s broad sanctioning power
pursuant to its inherent authority).
360. See supra Part II.C (examining the limitations on the court’s inherent
authority).
361. See supra Parts II.B–C (noting Rule 11’s amendment to include law firms
and the categorical finding of courts that inherent authority extends to law firms).
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Additionally, there are significant limitations on courts’ use of
Rule 11 and inherent authority. 362 On the one hand, § 1927
encompasses more conduct than Rule 11, but has more limited
utility because it does not reach parties and its application to law
firms is uncertain. 363 On the other hand, Rule 11 relates only to a
very narrow, specific set of actions but currently encompasses
parties, attorneys, and firms. 364 Amending § 1927 would give
courts the authority to award sanctions against firms for conduct
that Rule 11 does not encompass, not only in Rule 11 cases where
law firms file frivolous claims that multiply the proceedings.
Including law firms in § 1927’s authority thus does not negate the
need for Rule 11 because not all Rule 11 cases involve
unreasonably multiplied proceedings.
With respect to inherent authority’s limitations, courts will
not use their inherent power to sanction all the conduct possible
under § 1927. 365 Courts only rely upon their inherent authority in
extreme circumstances, whereas § 1927 sets a lower threshold by
allowing courts to sanction behavior provided the conduct in
question “multiplies the proceedings.” 366 Thus, amending § 1927 to
include law firms would allow district courts to rely on a clearly
worded statute to sanction firms in circumstances to which
inherent authority may not reach.
Another argument against including law firms in § 1927’s
sanctioning authority is that, like the 1993 pre-amendment
version of Rule 11, § 1927 does not explicitly reference law firms. 367
Several circuit courts have analogized the pre-1993 version of Rule
362. See supra Parts II.B–C (describing Rule 11’s narrow scope and courts’
reluctance to invoke their inherent authority).
363. See supra Part II.B (providing an in-depth discussion of the different
conduct and entities that § 1927 and Rule 11 respectively address).
364. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (reaching all actions that
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply the proceedings), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11
(contemplating documents signed and filed with the court that bring frivolous
claims).
365. See supra Part II.C (noting the simultaneously narrow and broad scope
of the court’s inherent authority).
366. See supra Parts II.A & II.C (distinguishing the standards for awarding
sanctions pursuant to § 1927 from those used to sanction under the court’s
inherent authority).
367. See supra Part III.A (describing the circuit court opinions finding Rule
11’s history analogous with § 1927 and concluding that the application of § 1927
should follow the Rule 11 precedent that Pavelic & LeFlore set).
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11 to § 1927. 368 The Supreme Court held that the pre-1993 version
of Rule 11 did not apply to law firms based on its finding that the
rule’s express language demonstrated a lack of congressional
intent to include law firms. 369 Because § 1927 does not expressly
include law firms, the Seventh Circuit found that it merited the
same narrow interpretation as the previous version of Rule 11. 370
Similarities exist between Rule 11 and § 1927, 371 but this Note
proposes that the differences between the rule and the statute
warrant different treatment for § 1927. Both rules seek to deter
frivolous litigation by allowing courts to sanction a party’s legal
counsel for its unethical behavior. 372 However, § 1927 originally
became law in 1813, long before Congress adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 373 Rule 11 addresses one very
specific aspect of litigation—signing court documents—while
§ 1927 expansively considers any action that unreasonably or
vexatiously multiplies litigation proceedings. 374 Finally, the source
of authority for § 1927 sanctions differs from that of Rule 11. 375 For
these reasons, the analogy between the pre-1993 version of Rule
11 and § 1927 has limited value and should not be given
unnecessary weight. 376
368. See supra Part III.A (noting the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit
opinions favoring the pre-1993 interpretation in Pavelic & LeFlore).
369. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 127 (1989)
(reversing the Second Circuit judgment allowing sanctions under Rule 11 against
a law firm).
370. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (pointing to
Pavelic & LeFlore as a source of strong support for its conclusion that district
courts do not have authority under § 1927 to sanction law firms).
371. See supra Parts II.A–B (emphasizing the relationship between § 1927
and Rule 11).
372. See supra Parts II.A–B (describing the scope and purpose of § 1927 and
Rule 11).
373. See supra Parts II.A–B (distinguishing § 1927’s history, which predated
the existence of law firms, from Rule 11’s development in the early twentieth
century).
374. See supra Parts II.A–B (noting that § 1927 applies throughout litigation
to any actions that multiply the proceedings, while Rule 11 provides for sanctions
when a party, attorney, or law firm file documents that lack merit).
375. See Talmadge et al., supra note 144, at 451 (noting that courts may not
simply use Rule 11 justifications to apply § 1927).
376. See Christopher D. Wolek, Practice and Procedure: The “Safe-Harbor”
Amendment to Rule 11 . . . Any Port in a Storm?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 350 (1994)
(“Federal district court judges should strive to consider the Rule 11 sanctions
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Even without drawing a parallel to Rule 11, the circuit courts
favoring a narrow statutory construction of § 1927 assert that the
plain language of § 1927 does not permit its application to law
firms because it does not explicitly include “law firms.” 377 A law
firm is neither an attorney nor a “person admitted to conduct
cases,” clearly limiting the statute’s scope according to these
courts’ interpretation. 378 Advocates of this approach contend that
if Congress intended the statute to include law firms, it could have
added the necessary language when it amended § 1927 in 1948 or
in 1980. 379 Law firms had clearly become a reality by the time of
those amendments. 380
Although it is true that Congress did not consider § 1927’s
application to law firms in the 1980 amendment, 381 the issue is
conspicuously absent only in hindsight. In 1980, Congress did not
consider whether § 1927 could or should authorize district courts
to sanction firms because there was virtually no record of the
statute’s application—to either attorneys or law firms. 382 The 1980
amendment considered two immediate issues raised by the very
limited existing § 1927 case law: the intent standard required by
the statute and whether to include attorneys’ fees. 383 Congress’s
lack of consideration does not indicate that it would find § 1927
limited to individual attorneys. Now that a substantial body of

structure as mutually exclusive of sanctions under [§ 1927] or inherent
authority.”).
377. See supra Part III.A (describing the reasoning of circuit courts limiting
§ 1927’s application to attorneys).
378. See supra notes 206–214 and accompanying text (noting that law firms
are not “admitted to conduct cases”).
379. The same argument exists for § 1927’s application to pro se litigants. See
Whitt, supra note 55, at 1381 (“If Congress wanted to extend the application to
pro se litigants, it would have amended the language of the statute to reach ‘other
persons conducting cases in any court of the United States’ when it removed
‘proctor.’”).
380. See supra Part II.D (outlining the development of law firms in the United
States).
381. See supra Parts II.A & II.D (discussing § 1927’s most recent legislative
history and the coextensive existence of law firms).
382. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the sparse § 1927 jurisprudence before
1980).
383. See supra Part II.A (noting the hearings regarding the proposed
amendment).
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§ 1927 jurisprudence exists, Congress should consider the scope of
§ 1927’s application.
This Note argues that Congress should amend § 1927 to
explicitly include law firms to remove the prevailing confusion
regarding the statute’s scope. Even with the current language,
however, the statute’s purpose allows for the implicit leap that
many courts have made from “attorney” 384 to “counsel” 385 to “law
firm.” 386 Courts frequently use these terms interchangeably. 387
Given the partnership liability’s presence in the nineteenth
century, 388 there may also be historical support for the notion that
Congress did not intend to limit liability under § 1927 to a single
attorney. 389
Even if courts favoring a narrow interpretation agree that
§ 1927 sanctions apply to multiple individual attorneys working on
a case, law firms are comprised of attorneys and non-attorneys, 390
arguably making them ineligible. Attorneys are, however,
responsible for the work of non-attorneys, 391 and law firms include
the costs associated with non-attorney work in their assessment of
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
385. See Field v. United States, 34 U.S. 182, 182–203 (1834) (referring to the
party’s attorney as “counsel”); Toledo Metal Wheel Co. v. Foyer Bros. & Co., 223
F. 350, 358 (6th Cir. 1915) (finding that “counsel multiplied the proceedings in
the case” involving a patent dispute for collapsible stroller).
386. See supra Part III.B (describing circuit court decisions that employed
these terms as if their meanings were synonymous).
387. See supra Part III.B (demonstrating the blending of these three terms in
circuit court cases over the course of the past twenty years).
388. See supra Part II.D (noting the predominance of solo practices and
partnerships in the first century of § 1927’s enactment and the liability shared by
partners).
389. Even with the 1948 amendment of § 1927, which inserted the word
“personally” into the statute, Congress appears to be attempting to prevent
sanctioned attorneys from passing the costs of sanctions on to their clients, rather
than precluding attorneys from sharing costs within a partnership or firm. See
supra note 193 and accompanying text (suggesting that Motion Picture Patents
used the word “personally” to distinguish attorney and client liability).
390. See LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(noting the “work by six partners, seven associates, two legal assistants, and four
other staffers” that went into the firm’s assessment of its unreasonably incurred
expenses).
391. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion
Draft 1983) (providing that a lawyer should “make reasonable efforts to ensure”
that the non-attorney’s conduct “is compatible with the professional obligations
of the lawyer”).
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fees. 392 No single attorney should be liable for the costs incurred by
the opposing party’s team of attorneys and assistants 393 if he or she
litigated the case as an associate authorized by a firm or as a
member of a legal team.
If § 1927 applies to law firms, one concern is that parties will
seek sanctions against law firms because firms have deeper
pockets than individual attorneys and will be able to pay the full
amount of attorney’s fees and costs. 394 This outcome may be fair
where the firm directly authorized the actions of its attorneys. The
deterrent effect of sanctioning a firm could arguably be negligible
in the context of large firms, however, which may have branches
across multiple states or countries and hundreds or even
thousands of practicing attorneys. 395 Yet, if courts sanction law
firms under § 1927 for frivolously pursued litigation, perhaps the
issuance of sanctions will induce these law firms to manage more
carefully the actions of their legal teams and associates. In
addition to sanctioning firms, courts could also maintain the
statute’s individual deterrent effect by continuing to sanction
individual attorneys when the attorneys are identifiable. 396
392. See LaPrade, 146 F.3d at 902 (including the work done by two legal
assistants and four other law firm staffers in calculations for a sanctions award).
393. The amounts of sanctions can be significant, ranging from tens of
thousands dollars to as much as several million dollars. See, e.g, BDT Prods., Inc.
v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 743 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing a lower court
judgment for over five million dollars); LaPrade, 146 F.3d at 900 (assessing
sanctions of almost $75,000 against a law firm).
394. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126–27
(1989) (considering the policy implications of applying the pre-1993 version of
Rule 11 to law firms). Ultimately, the Court decided that allowing law firm
liability would not serve the rule’s deterrent effect on the individual. See id. at
127 (noting that “there will be greater economic deterrence upon the signing
attorney, who will know for certain that the district court will impose its sanction
entirely upon him”). The Court conceded that extending Rule 11’s application to
law firms would “better guarantee reimbursement of the innocent party for
expenses caused by the Rule 11 violation, since the partnership will normally
have more funds than the individual signing attorney.” Id. at 126.
395. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 181, at 539 (describing the exponential growth
of American law firms in the twentieth century).
396. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
the sanctions issued against the attorney and the law firm). One concern is that
amending the statute to include law firms might create more uncertainty about
whether courts should sanction the offending attorney, the firm, or both. See
Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 127 (“[T]here will be greater economic deterrence
upon the signing attorney, who will know for certain that the district court will
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Alternatively, if § 1927 does not include law firms, parties may
be unable to get redress in cases where the law firm, and not one
individual lawyer, is the bad actor. 397 This is also true when
sanctions make one attorney liable for the excess costs and
attorneys’ fees of an opposing party’s law firm and the attorney is
unable to satisfy the amount. 398 Although courts have stated that
the purpose of § 1927 is not compensation, 399 part of the statute’s
deterrent intent is redressing the costs generated by the opposing
party as a result of the offending counsel’s unreasonable and
vexatious behavior. Thus, allowing law firms to be jointly and
severally liable serves the purpose of § 1927 by increasing the
likelihood that the offending party pays the full amount of the
sanctions.
VI. Conclusion
Examining the sanctions mechanisms available to courts for
deterring the unethical behavior of attorneys and law firms, as
well as the statutory development, case law, and historical context
of § 1927, this Note contends that § 1927 should extend to law
firms. Although § 1927 did not originally contemplate law firms,
its purpose—to deter unnecessary litigation—supports courts
using the statute to sanction law firms engaging in conduct that
vexatiously and unreasonably multiplies litigation proceedings.
Historically, courts invoked § 1927 very rarely, but in the context
of the modern legal landscape and the dramatic increase in
reliance on § 1927 sanctions, courts should also sanction law
firms—which can outspend and out-resource solo practitioners—
under the statute.

impose its sanctions entirely upon him, and not divert part of it to a partnership
of which he may not (if he is a only an associate) be a member . . . .”).
397. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126–27 (discussing whether Rule 11,
if applied to law firms, would achieve its intended purpose).
398. See Endo, supra note 9, at 293–95 (noting that some circuit courts
require, and some allow, district courts to consider an attorney’s ability to pay
when assessing § 1927 sanctions in cases where the costs and attorneys’ fees
ranged from $5,000 to more than $360,000).
399. See id. at 300 (“Judge Easterbrook . . . described § 1927 as a sanction
rule, not a compensation device.”).
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Judicial construction in favor of applying § 1927 to law firms
is useful, but this Note advocates a statutory amendment that
definitively resolves the question by including the words “law
firm.” Although such an amendment may seem initially distasteful
to law firms, it will encourage better enforcement of ethical
behavior and provide more certainty in terms of liability for
conduct deemed unethical. In cases where one law firm seeks
sanctions against another and wants compensation for its
accumulated attorneys’ fees, this result is certainly equitable. This
Note’s proposed amendment to § 1927 will resolve the current split
among the federal circuit courts regarding whether district courts
have authority under § 1927 to sanction law firms, allowing courts
to focus on the merits of cases and providing them, at their
discretion, with statutory means to hold law firms, as well as
attorneys, accountable for conduct that vexatiously and
unreasonably multiplies litigation proceedings.

